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Specific Intent and the Purposeful 
Narrowing of Victim Protection Under 
the Convention Against Torture 
ean Etienne, a native of Haiti, is a lawful permanent resident of the 
United States who was convicted for possession of marijuana with 
intent to distribute, a conviction that subjects him to both mandatory 
detention and deportation under U.S. immigration law.1  He already 
served a sentence in the United States yet, in Haiti, he will face 
potentially indefinite detention in an overcrowded, dirty prison cell 
with little food or clean water.2  The purpose for this detention is 
preventive3: the Haitian government wants to keep bad guys like Jean 
Etienne off the streets of the country and deter these offenders from 
committing future crimes.4  Compounding his problem, Jean is HIV-
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1 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(B), 1226(c) (2006).  Jean Etienne is a fictitious character; 
however, his story is based on the facts of a real case in which the author was involved. 
2 Richard Chacon, Imprisoned by Policy, Convicts Deported by US Languish in Haitian 
Jails, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 19, 2000, at A1; Gary Marx, New Life Is No Life for U.S. Ex-
Cons in Haiti, CHI. TRIB., May 17, 2007, at C1. 
3 See In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 300 (B.I.A. 2002). 
4 Id. at 300 (citing Letter from William E. Dilday, Dir. of Office of Country Reports and 
Asylum Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Immigration Judge (Apr. 12, 2001); BUREAU OF 
DEMOCRACY, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HAITI: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
PRACTICES 2000 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/wha/ 
795.htm); Amy Bracken, Influx of Deportees Stirs Anger in Haiti: Some Believe US Policy 
Helped Boost Crime Rate, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 11, 2007, at A6. 
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positive and relies on medications to survive; the Haitian officials will 
not provide him with these medications in detention.5 
Jean Etienne can seek protection under Article 3 of the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),6 which the United States 
ratified in 1998.7  Article 3 protects someone like Jean Etienne from 
removal8 to a country “where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture,”9 
regardless of the crimes that subjected him to removal.10  However, in 
2002, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decided that 
applicants like Jean Etienne, who fear imprisonment in such atrocious 
conditions upon their arrival in Haiti, could not seek such protection 
because they could not prove that the Haitian government specifically 
intended to cause them severe pain or suffering.11  Under the BIA’s 
definition of specific intent, such petitioners must prove that the 
Haitian government will detain them with the precise purpose of 
causing severe pain or suffering.12 
Specific intent is a criminal law term.13  So, why is it implicated 
when someone seeks protection under the CAT?  The United States 
modified the definition of torture under the CAT by conditioning the 
 
5 See ALTERNATIVE CHANCE, WHERE AM I?: A GUIDE TO ADJUSTING TO HAITI 
AGAINST YOUR WILL, SURVIVING DETENTION IN POLICE STATION HOLDING CELL AND 
HOW TO AGITATE FOR YOUR RELEASE (2007), http://www.alternativechance.org/ 
WHERE-AM-I-A-Guide-to-Adjusting-to-Haiti-Against-Your-Will-Excerpt-. 
6 United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 114 [hereinafter CAT]. 
7 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XXII, § 2242, 
112 Stat. 2681, 2681–822 (1998).  The implementing regulations are 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16-
208.18 (2009). 
8 The 1996 reforms to the Immigration and Nationality Act discontinued the use of the 
term “deportation” and replaced it with “removal.”  See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 301, 110 
Stat. 3009-546, 3009-575. 
9 CAT, supra note 6, art. 3, para. 1, at 114. 
10 No exceptional circumstances justify expelling a person to a country where there 
would be danger of being subjected to torture.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.17 (2009); David 
Weissbrodt & Isabel Hörtreiter, The Principle of Non-Refoulement: Article 3 of the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment in Comparison with the Non-Refoulement Provisions of Other International 
Human Rights Treaties, 5 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 15 (1999). 
11 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 300 (B.I.A. 2002). 
12 Id. at 301. 
13 See generally 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 5.2(e) (2d ed. 
2003). 
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treaty’s ratification upon an understanding that “intentionally 
inflicted” severe pain or suffering means that such pain or suffering 
must be “specifically intended.”14  The meaning of “specific intent,” 
however, is not self-evident.  The phrase is an antiquated criminal law 
term15 that sometimes means only purposeful conduct,16 other times 
means acting purposefully or knowing that the forbidden 
consequences are foreseeable,17 or on occasion means acting with 
willful blindness to the foreseeable consequences.18  In the decision 
In re J-E-, the BIA chose the most narrow definition, “purposeful,” in 
its interpretation of the CAT and, in doing so, shifted the focus in 
CAT protection cases off the victim and onto the alleged torturer.19 
In this Article, I argue that the BIA has adopted a misguided 
approach to CAT protection that creates an insurmountable obstacle 
to actually obtaining such protection.20  As a solution, I propose that 
Attorney General Eric Holder, under the new Obama administration, 
adopt a revised definition of specific intent that includes “knowing 
that severe pain or suffering is foreseeable.”  Such a definition is 
consistent with the legislative history and purpose of the CAT and 
finds ample support in criminal law jurisprudence.21  In addition, this 
definition of specific intent is used by the Office of Legal Counsel of 
the U.S. Department of Justice in its analysis of whether certain 
interrogation techniques would subject Central Intelligence Agency 
operatives to prosecution under the CAT.22  An alternative solution is 
for U.S. courts to employ a “knowledge of foreseeable consequences” 
definition of specific intent in CAT protection cases.  Courts can 
adopt this definition notwithstanding the principles of agency 
 
14 S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, REPORT ON CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 
AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT, S. EXEC. 
REP. NO. 101-30, at 9 (1990) [hereinafter CAT REPORT]. 
15 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 403–04 (1980). 
16 See, e.g., United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995). 
17 See, e.g., United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1979). 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985). 
19 See In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 298–99 (B.I.A. 2002). 
20 See Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 474 (3d Cir. 2003). 
21 See infra Parts II.A and III.B and cases cited therein. 
22 Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to the Deputy 
Att’y Gen. (Dec. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Levin Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
olc/18usc23402340a2.htm. 
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deference embodied in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. (Chevron).23 
Part I discusses the drafting of the CAT, the definition of “torture” 
under Article 1 of the treaty, and the two understandings that the U.S. 
Senate inserted during the ratification of the treaty: (1) that the 
definition of torture include a specific intent requirement and (2) that 
applicants for protection under Article 3 of the CAT prove they are 
more likely than not to suffer torture.  Part II discusses the meaning of 
specific intent in domestic criminal law to give context to the Senate’s 
specific intent understanding.  Part III describes the BIA’s 
interpretation of the “specific intent” and “more likely than not” 
understandings in its 2002 decision In re J-E-.  This Part highlights 
problems with the BIA’s approach, which ignores criminal law 
precedent on specific intent and, in selecting a narrow definition of 
specific intent, views Article 3 cases as prosecutions of a criminal 
defendant accused of torture, not as evaluations of the likely harm to 
the victim.  Part IV illustrates these differing viewpoints of Article 3 
protection by examining recent decisions by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit, which has analyzed the specific intent 
requirement of CAT protection in several cases in recent years.  Part 
V proposes a “knowing of the foreseeable consequences” definition 
of specific intent, which is more consistent with the purpose of Article 
3 protection and the legislative history of the treaty’s U.S. ratification.  
This Part also argues that this definition of specific intent finds ample 
support in criminal law jurisprudence and in the 2004 Office of Legal 
Counsel memorandum regarding whether certain interrogation 
techniques would subject U.S. troops to prosecution under the CAT.  
Part VI proposes that the U.S. Department of Justice modify its 
definition of specific intent in CAT protection cases; in the 
alternative, courts should adopt this more generous reading of specific 
intent.  Part VI also examines policy concerns that the U.S. Attorney 
General must address to implement this solution, and addresses how 
the doctrine of Chevron deference does not prevent courts from 
adopting a more equitable definition of specific intent. 
 
23 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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I 
BACKGROUND 
Torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or 
punishment is prohibited pursuant to several human rights 
instruments,24 including the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.25  In 1974, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
directed the UN Congress “‘to give urgent attention to the question of 
the development of an international code of ethics for police and 
related law enforcement agencies’” and “‘to include, in the 
elaboration of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners, rules for the protection of all persons subjected to any form 
of detention or imprisonment against torture and other cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.’”26  One year later, the UN 
General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Protection of All 
Persons Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.27  Subsequently, several bodies 
under the auspices of the United Nations drafted the CAT.28  The 
CAT was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 10, 
1984.29  Its principal aim was not to outlaw torture and other cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; the CAT is based 
upon the recognition that these practices are already outlawed under 
 
24 Prohibitions of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment are found in Article 7 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Article 3 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Article 5 of the 1969 American Convention on Human 
Rights, Article 5 of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Article 7 of 
the 1981 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
concerning humanitarian law applicable to armed conflicts, and the 1955 U.N. Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.  J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS 
DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON 
THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING 
TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 11–12 (1988). 
25 Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”  
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, 73, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948). 
26 BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 14–15 (quoting a draft resolution of the 
1974 UN General Assembly). 
27 Id. at 17. 
28 The UN General Assembly, the UN Commission on Human Rights, and working 
groups established by the Commission all contributed to the drafting of the CAT.  Id. at 
31. 
29 Id. at v. 
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international law.30  Rather, its purpose was “to strengthen the 
existing prohibition of such practices.”31 
The United States, which engaged in seven years of negotiations 
regarding the CAT,32 advocated for a limited definition of “torture,” 
including only extreme forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment.33  Despite other countries’ attempts to 
expand the definition of “torture,” the United States succeeded in 
defining torture as “severe” pain or suffering.34  The United States 
also negotiated, unilaterally, to limit the definition of “torture” to acts 
“specifically intended.”35  However, the definition of torture 
ultimately included all “intentional” acts.36 
The definition of “torture” under Article 1 of the CAT is: 
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as 
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, 
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is 
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a 
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, 
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person 
acting in an official capacity.  It does not include pain or suffering 
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.37 
 
30 Id. at 1. 
31 Id.  As such, the CAT proposed to “make more effective the struggle against torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world.”  
CAT, supra note 6, preamble, at 113. 
32 CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 2. 
33 AHCENE BOULESBAA, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS 
FOR ENFORCEMENT 16–17 (1999); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 40. 
34 BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 16. 
35 “The U.S. was the only country that was not satisfied with the term ‘intentionally.’  
No other State commented on it; it invited no serious discussion from the Working Group 
and the U.S.’s proposal was not adopted.”  Id. at 20.  In addition, the United States sought 
to limit the definition of torture to acts that were “deliberately and maliciously inflicted on 
a person.”  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 41. 
36 CAT, supra note 6, art. 1, para. 1, at 113–14; BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, 
at 118 (“[T]orture must be an intentional act.  It follows that where pain or suffering is the 
result of an accident or of mere negligence, the criteria for regarding the act as torture are 
not fulfilled.”).  “Torture” is defined in Article 1 of the CAT; Articles 1 through 16 contain 
the substantive provisions of the treaty.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 1.  
Articles 17 through 24 contain the implementation provisions.  Id. 
37 CAT, supra note 6, art. 1, para. 1, at 113–14.  While Article 1 relates to acts that 
amount to torture, Article 16 relates to the other acts of cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment or punishment prevented by the CAT.  Article 16 obligates signatories of the 
CAT to prevent the following in their own territories: 
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Article 3 of the CAT contains a protective feature that was inspired 
by international human rights instruments.38  This protection prohibits 
signatories from expelling, returning, or extraditing a person to a 
country “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”39 
A.  The CAT in U.S. Immigration Law 
On April 18, 1988, the United States signed the CAT and reserved 
the right to communicate, upon ratification, such reservations, 
interpretive understandings, or declarations as were deemed 
necessary.40  President Ronald Reagan transmitted the CAT to the 
Senate for advice and consent in May 1988, proposing a list of 
reservations, understandings, and declarations, which were revised 
and resubmitted by President George H.W. Bush in January 1990.41  
 
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not 
amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at 
the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity. 
Id. art. 16, para. 1, at 116.  The drafters of the CAT recognized that, unlike defining 
torture, it was impossible to draft a precise definition of other “cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”  For this reason, the CAT could not impose legal 
obligations (i.e., preventing deportation under Article 16) on countries if the obligations 
stemmed from a vague concept like cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.  
BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 8. 
38 Article 3 has no equivalent in the 1975 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons 
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment.  “The article had been inspired by the case-law of the European Commission 
of Human Rights with regard to article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.” 
BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 125.  The European Commission decided that 
“the prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment in article 3 of the European 
Convention” not only obligates countries to prevent torture within their own territories, but 
also to refrain from sending a person to a country where the deportee would face such 
treatment.  Id.  The original draft of Article 3 of the CAT referred only to expulsion and 
extradition; the reference to return or “refoulement” was added “with article 33 of the 
Refugee Convention as an obvious source of inspiration.”  Id. at 126. 
39 CAT, supra note 6, art. 3, para. 1, at 114.  Article 3 obligates countries to protect 
persons only from a return to a country where the deportees would suffer torture, but the 
law does not require that countries protect persons from return to a country where the 
deportees would be subjected to other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or 
punishment.  See id.  The original draft proposed that there should be reasonable grounds 
for believing that the person would be subjected to torture; the term “substantial” was later 
substituted in order to make the wording more precise.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 
24, at 127.  “The question as to whether or not such substantial grounds exist in a given 
case must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of that case.”  Id. 
40 CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 2–4. 
41 Id. at 2, 7–11. 
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In August 1990, the Senate adopted a resolution of advice and consent 
that incorporated these reservations, understandings, and 
declarations;42 President Clinton then deposited the instrument of 
ratification with the United Nations in October 1994.43 
Because the CAT was not self-executing,44 Congress adopted it 
into law through the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 
1998 (FARRA)45 and required the appropriate agencies to promulgate 
regulations within 120 days.46  The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) 
promulgated these regulations in 1999,47 creating two defenses to 
removal under the CAT: withholding of removal and deferral of 
removal.48  Once an applicant for withholding or deferral of removal 
under Article 3 of the CAT proves the likelihood of torture in the 
country to which the applicant will be removed, the United States 
 
42 Id. at 1. 
43 BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 12 n.2. 
44 The Senate’s advice and consent to the ratification of the CAT was subject to the 
declaration that Articles 1 through 16 of the law were not self-executing.  CAT REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 10. 
45 Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XXII, § 
2242, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681-822 (1998).  FARRA § 2242(a) states: 
It shall be the policy of the United States not to expel, extradite, or otherwise 
effect the involuntary return of any person to a country in which there are 
substantial grounds for believing the person would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture, regardless of whether the person is physically present in the 
United States. 
Id. § 2242(a), 112 Stat. at 2681–822. 
46 Id. § 2242(b), 112 Stat. at 2681–822. 
47 Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478 (Feb. 19, 
1999). 
48 8 C.F.R. § 208.18 (2009).  Both withholding and deferral of removal under the CAT 
use the same definition of “torture.”  See id.  A grant of deferral of removal under the CAT 
can be more easily revoked than a grant of withholding of removal.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 
208.16, 208.17(d) (2009); Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 
Fed. Reg. at 8481–82. 
Under existing regulations, withholding can only be terminated when the 
government moves to reopen the case, meets the standards for reopening, and 
meets its burden of proof to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
alien is not eligible for withholding.  The termination process for deferral of 
removal is designed to be much more accessible, so that deferral can be 
terminated quickly and efficiently when appropriate. 
Regulations Concerning the Convention Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. at 8482.  
Withholding of removal under the CAT, however, is not available to persons who have 
been convicted of a “particularly serious crime”; whereas deferral of removal under the 
CAT has no criminal bar.  See 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(d)(2), 208.17. 
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may not send the applicant to that country.49  These defenses are often 
the only available relief for noncitizens who cannot prove a case of 
asylum or nonrefoulement (nonreturn) under the United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee 
Convention)50 because these individuals cannot demonstrate a nexus 
between the harm feared and a protected ground.51  In addition, 
deferral of removal under the CAT is often the only defense for 
applicants whose criminal record bars them from seeking other relief 
from removal.52 
 
49 Relief under Article 3 of the CAT is mandatory, not discretionary.  See 8 C.F.R. § 
208.16(c)(4) (“If the immigration judge determines that the alien is more likely than not to 
be tortured in the country of removal, the alien is entitled to protection under the 
Convention Against Torture.”). 
50 The U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is binding on the United 
States through its accession to the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.  
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 189 
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.  Article 33 of the Refugee 
Convention prohibits refoulement (returning) of a refugee to territories if the refugee’s life 
or freedom would be threatened.  Refugee Convention, supra, art. 33.1, 189 U.N.T.S. at 
176.  The law regarding nonrefoulement, which is referred to as “withholding of removal,” 
is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006).  Asylum, which may be granted in the 
Attorney General’s discretion to anyone who meets the definition of a “refugee” under the 
Refugee Convention, was created through the Refugee Act of 1980.  THOMAS 
ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 
847–49 (6th ed. 2008).  For the law relating to asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006). 
51 Asylum seekers and applicants for the withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3) must demonstrate that the feared persecution is on account of their race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social group.  See 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b), 1231(b)(3) (2006); INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 
478, 481 (1992).  Applicants for protection under Article 3 of the CAT, however, need 
only demonstrate that they will face torture; the torture can be inflicted for any reason 
whatsoever.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 125.  For example, Haitian criminal 
deportees such as Jean Etienne have unsuccessfully argued that they would suffer 
persecution on account of their membership in a particular social group, i.e., Haitian 
criminal deportees.  See Toussaint v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 455 F.3d 409, 418 (3d Cir. 
2006); Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 397 (1st Cir. 2004).  Such applicants could only 
seek protection under Article 3 of the CAT. 
52 For example, noncitizens who have been convicted of “particularly serious crimes” 
are not eligible for asylum or withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  8 
U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(2)(A)(ii), 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii) (2006); see also In re N-A-M-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 336, 342–43 (B.I.A. 2007) (describing the analysis used by the BIA for determining 
whether an offense is a “particularly serious crime”).  An “aggravated felony” conviction 
is enough to disqualify an applicant from asylum.  8 U.S.C § 1158(b)(2)(B)(i).  An 
“aggravated felony” conviction with a five-year sentence is enough to disqualify an 
applicant from withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C § 1231(b)(3)(B).  The offenses that 
qualify as “aggravated felonies” can be as minor as a misdemeanor shoplifting crime with 
a suspended sentence of one year.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (2006).  The BIA has 
also held that certain types of offenses (e.g., drug trafficking crimes) are per se 
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The Senate adopted an understanding that further defined the 
prohibition in Article 3 on expelling, returning, or extraditing a person 
to a country “where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”53  This 
understanding required that an applicant for protection under the CAT 
prove it is “more likely than not that he would be [tortured].”54  This 
standard was already in use in U.S. law applying the Refugee 
Convention.55  U.S. application of the nonreturn provisions of the 
Refugee Convention requires a showing that an applicant more likely 
than not will be persecuted on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular social 
group.56  The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this standard in the 
context of the Refugee Convention and confirmed that the applicant 
must show a fifty-one percent likelihood of persecution.57 
 
“particularly serious crimes” that will disqualify an applicant from asylum or withholding 
of removal.  See In re Y-L-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 270, 274–77 (B.I.A. 2002).  There is a 
“particularly serious crime” bar to withholding of removal under the CAT; however, there 
is no crime bar to deferral of removal.  8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(d)(3); 208.17 (2009); 
Weissbrodt & Hörtreiter, supra note 10, at 16 (describing that the drafters of Article 3 of 
the CAT deliberately did not adopt the limitations on nonrefoulement included in other 
treaties, such as the “particularly serious crime” bar included in Article 33.1 of the 
Refugee Convention, because “no exceptional circumstances justify expelling a person to 
a country where she or he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”).  Therefore, in 
many of the cases discussed in Part IV, infra, the applicant could only apply for deferral of 
removal under the CAT if the person was barred from asylum or withholding of removal 
due to a “particularly serious crime.”  See, e.g., Lavira v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 478 F.3d 
158, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2007) (discussing the phrase “particularly serious crime”). 
53 CAT, supra note 6, art. 3, para. 1, at 114. 
54 CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 10, 16. 
55 Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits a state from expelling or returning a 
refugee to territories where the refugee’s life or freedom would be threatened.  Refugee 
Convention, supra note 50, art. 33.1, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176. 
56 See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). 
57 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447–48 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 
429–30 (1984).  While an applicant for asylum need only demonstrate a “well-founded 
fear” of persecution, which translates to a ten percent likelihood, an applicant for 
withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) must demonstrate that persecution is 
“more likely than not” to occur, which translates to a fifty-one percent likelihood.  
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 458 (Powell, J., dissenting).  The United States adopted the 
more stringent “more likely than not” standard for relief under the CAT because the 
Reagan and Bush administrations regarded the nonreturn prohibition in Article 3 of the 
CAT as analogous to the mandatory withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).  
See Convention Against Torture: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 
101st Cong. 18 (1990) [hereinafter CAT Hearing] (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice) (“Because there is no discretion under Article 
3, the lower standard that exists for asylum (i.e., ‘well founded fear of persecution,’ 8 
U.S.C. Sec. 1158) is simply inappropriate.”); CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 10. 
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Since the CAT regulations were promulgated in 1999, courts have 
interpreted claims for CAT protection in numerous cases.58  The most 
important cases surround the “specific intent” requirement. 
B.  U.S. Definition of Torture Requires Specific Intent 
The specific intent requirement originated with an understanding 
proposed by President Reagan;59 the U.S. Senate adopted a version of 
Reagan’s understanding,60 which meant that U.S. obligations under 
 
58 For example, a CAT applicant must prove either that the torture will be inflicted at 
the hands of a government actor or that the government acquiesces in the torture.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.18(a)(1) (2009); BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 119–20 (“[O]nly torture 
for which the authorities could be held responsible should fall within the article’s 
definition.  If torture is committed without any involvement of the authorities, but as a 
criminal act by private persons, it can be expected that the normal machinery of justice 
will operate and that prosecution and punishment will follow under the normal conditions 
of the domestic legal system.”).  Some courts hold that a showing of the government’s 
willful blindness is needed to prove acquiescence.  See, e.g., Zheng v. Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 
1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that government acquiescence can be proved through 
a demonstration of willful blindness).  But see In re S-V-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1306, 1311–13 
(B.I.A. 2000) (holding that willful blindness is not sufficient to prove the government 
acquiescence requirement under the CAT). 
59 President Reagan had submitted an understanding “that, in order to constitute torture, 
an act must be a deliberate and calculated act of an extremely cruel and inhuman nature, 
specifically intended to inflict excruciating and agonizing physical or mental pain or 
suffering.”  CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 15; Message from the President of the United 
States Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, S. Treaty Doc. 100-20, at 4 (1988) [hereinafter 
Message from the President].  The summary and technical analysis of the CAT submitted 
by President Reagan to the Senate stated: 
[T]he requirement of intent to cause severe pain and suffering is of particular 
importance in the case of alleged mental pain and suffering, as well as in cases 
where unexpectedly severe physical suffering is caused.  Because specific intent 
is required, an act that results in unanticipated and unintended severity of pain 
and suffering is not torture for purposes of this Convention. 
CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 13–14; Message from the President, supra, at 3.  The 
Senate revised the Reagan administration’s proposed understanding, which was criticized 
for setting too high a threshold of pain for an act to constitute torture.  CAT REPORT, 
supra note 14, at 9. 
60 The understanding adopted by the Senate with reference to Article 1 was: 
The United States understands that, in order to constitute torture, an act must be 
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and 
that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by or 
resulting from: (1) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe 
physical pain or suffering; (2) the administration or application, or threatened 
administration or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures 
calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality; (3) the threat of 
imminent death; or (4) the threat that another person will imminently be 
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or 
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the CAT became effective in domestic law subject to this 
understanding.61  Because the executive branch and Senate saw the 
CAT as a codification of an international crime of torture,62 their 
overriding concerns were to “be clear about what is going to be 
punished”63 and “to guard against the improper application of the 
Convention to legitimate U.S. law enforcement actions.”64  The DOJ 
advocated for a specific intent requirement to solve the problem of an 
imprecise definition of torture in Article 1: “This definitional 
vagueness makes it very doubtful that the United States can, 
consistent with [c]onstitutional due process constraints, fulfill its 
obligation under the Convention to adequately engraft the definition 
of torture into the domestic criminal law of the United States.”65 
 
application of mind altering substances or other procedures calculated to disrupt 
profoundly the senses or personality. 
CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 9.  In light of this understanding, the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations noted that rough and deplorable treatment, such as police brutality, does 
not amount to torture.  Id. at 13–14. 
61 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 314 cmt. d (1986). 
62 CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 4 (statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal 
Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State) (“The essential purpose of this convention is to codify 
international law regarding the crime of torture, and to require party states to deter and 
punish acts of torture pursuant to their domestic laws.”).  The State Department stated that 
the approach of the CAT “is more similar to the terrorism conventions than it is to the 
genocide convention.”  Id. at 5. 
63 Id.; see also id. at 3 (statement of Sen. Larry Pressler) (“What happened to the 
requirement in American law . . . that no one can be subjected to trial and punishment 
under American law without a statute first having defined the crime and then provided for 
a specific punishment?”). 
64 CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 15.  Some Senators on the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations expressed concern both that several of the “worst violators of human 
rights” had already signed the CAT and that such countries could haul the United States 
before the International Court of Justice; a vague definition of “torture” would make 
unfounded prosecutions of the United States more likely.  See CAT Hearing, supra note 
57, at 1–4 (statements of Sen. Jesse Helms and Sen. Larry Pressler).  The Assistant 
Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of Justice expressed 
the same concern: 
The Convention places U.S. law enforcement officials, when traveling overseas, 
at risk of arrest and prosecution in foreign jurisdictions, or even extradition to a 
third country, for purported violations committed within the United States. . . . 
 A related concern, flowing from the definitional problem, is that the 
Convention may be used by some unscrupulous foreign governments as a pretext 
for hostile actions against U.S. officials. 
Id. at 16 (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
65 CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 15–16 (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant 
Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
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The DOJ regulations tracked this understanding when describing 
who could seek protection from removal under the CAT.  The 
regulation, located in 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a), defines torture almost 
exactly as the term is defined by Article 1 of the CAT but added a 
specific intent requirement: “In order to constitute torture, an act must 
be specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or 
suffering.  An act that results in unanticipated or unintended severity 
of pain and suffering is not torture.”66 
II 
SPECIFIC INTENT IN CRIMINAL LAW: WHAT DID THE SENATE 
UNDERSTAND? 
An examination of specific intent in domestic criminal law is 
necessary to understand the rationale for including a specific intent 
requirement in the CAT, which the executive branch and Senate 
viewed as an international codification of the crime of torture.67  
Criminal law was created to redress the harms that a person causes to 
society.68  Because a defendant will receive punishment for producing 
this harm, courts interpreting criminal statutes favor injecting a mens 
rea, or guilty mind, requirement into every criminal statute.69  This 
canon of statutory interpretation in criminal law, which is known as 
the presumption in favor of scienter, operates with the goal that the 
innocent actor who accidentally caused harm to society will not be 
punished.70  Traditionally, legislatures defined a harm that they 
 
66 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) (2009).  The DOJ also supplemented the Article 1 definition 
of torture by confining the definition to only extreme forms of cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading treatment or punishment.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(2) (“Torture is an extreme 
form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment that do not amount to torture.”). 
67 See CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 3 (statement of Sen. Larry Pressler); id. at 4 
(statement of Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State). 
68 See Bruce Ledewitz, Mr. Carroll’s Mental State or What Is Meant by Intent, 38 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 71, 82 (2001) (“What we are seeking to punish in criminal law is sin, which 
sometimes is referred to by the less religious sounding term, ‘moral desert.’” (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Michael S. Moore, More on Act and Crime, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1749, 
1751 (1994))). 
69 See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 70 (1994); Staples v. 
United States, 511 U.S. 600, 618 (1994); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 
(1952). 
70 Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905, 905 (1939) 
(“Deeply ingrained in human nature is the tendency to distinguish intended results from 
accidental happenings.  ‘I didn’t mean to’ is an explanation so frequently accepted that it is 
often one of the early acquisitions of small children.”).  Public welfare statutes, in which 
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sought to prevent yet allowed courts to decide what mens rea was 
appropriate for a certain punishment.71 
At common law, courts separated culpability into two levels: 
specific and general intent.  “[T]he most common usage of ‘specific 
intent’ is to designate a special mental element which is required 
above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus 
reus of the crime.”72  “Historically, ‘general intent’ referred to any 
offense for which the only mens rea required was a blameworthy state 
of mind; ‘specific intent’ was meant to emphasize that the definition 
of the offense expressly required proof of a particular mental state.”73  
For some offenses, “specific intent” designates a heightened level of 
culpability, which demands a harsher punishment.74  For other 
 
the legislature deems that the harm to society is so great that an actor must be punished for 
causing such harm even if the causation was innocent, are an exception to this general 
presumption in favor of scienter.  See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 
280–81 (1943); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 251–52 (1922). 
71 See Robert Batey, Judicial Exploitation of Mens Rea Confusion, at Common Law and 
Under the Model Penal Code, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 343 (2001) (“Courts assume that 
legislatures have injected (or failed to inject) mens rea terms into statutory definitions of 
crimes with little thought to the precise implications of their actions; instead, it is the 
courts that should determine those implications, through construction of the terms used (or 
not used).”). 
72 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2(e); see also People v. Hood, 462 P.2d 370, 378 (Cal. 
1969) (“When the definition [of a crime] refers to defendant’s intent to do some further act 
or achieve some additional consequence, the crime is deemed to be one of specific 
intent.”).  For example, at common law, larceny requires the taking and carrying away of 
property of another with the specific intent to steal the property.  Similarly, common law 
burglary requires a breaking and entry into the dwelling of another with the specific intent 
to commit a felony therein.  LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2(e). 
73 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.06, at 147 (4th ed. 2006).  
For example, at common law, burglary was defined as “‘breaking and entering of the 
dwelling of another in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony.’”  Id. (quoting Mondie 
v. Commonwealth of Ky., 158 S.W.3d 203, 207 (Ky. 2005)).  The requisite mens rea 
pertains to a future act, the intent to commit a felony, and therefore, the offense requires a 
specific intent.  Id. at 147–48. 
74 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1980).  For example, the Supreme Court 
has discussed the meaning of specific intent in the context of whether the death penalty 
was an appropriate punishment; this level of punishment is only proportional to the crime 
if the defendant specifically intended to kill.  See Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801 
(1982) (holding that the imposition of the death penalty in cases where a felony murderer 
did not intend to kill violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual 
punishment); see also Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 156 (1987) (“Deeply ingrained in 
our legal tradition is the idea that the more purposeful is the criminal conduct, the more 
serious is the offense, and, therefore, the more severely it ought to be punished.”).  In 
Tison, the Supreme Court held that a felony murder defendant who substantially 
participated in a felony committed with reckless indifference to human life had the specific 
intent necessary to merit the death penalty.  Tison, 481 U.S. at 158.  This case is discussed 
in more detail in Part III.B, infra.  Courts and commentators have also suggested that the 
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offenses, a specific intent mens rea is necessary to punish someone 
whose criminalized act does not reflect the harm that society 
ultimately sought to prevent.75 
A.  Different Definitions of Specific Intent 
The terms “purpose” and “knowing” are often discussed when 
differentiating between specific and general intent.76  Acting 
“purposefully” requires that the defendant consciously desire the 
forbidden result, whatever the likelihood of that result actually 
occurring from the conduct.77  Acting “knowingly” requires that the 
defendant be aware that the result is practically certain to follow from 
the conduct, whatever the defendant’s desire may be to bring about 
that result.78  According to some scholars, “[t]he essence of the 
narrow distinction between these two culpability levels is the 
presence or absence of a positive desire to cause the result; purpose 
requires a culpability beyond the knowledge of a result’s near 
certainty.”79 
Both state and federal courts have described the differences 
between specific and general intent with varying definitions of 
 
distinction between specific and general intent evolved as a judicial response to the 
problem of the intoxicated offender; intoxication could negate specific intent but it could 
not negate general intent.  See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 46 (1996) (“Over the 
course of the 19th century, courts carved out an exception to the common law’s traditional 
across-the-board condemnation of the drunken offender, allowing a jury to consider a 
defendant’s intoxication when assessing whether he possessed the mental state needed to 
commit the crime charged, where the crime was one requiring a ‘specific intent.’”); United 
States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 679 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[D]iminished capacity, like voluntary 
intoxication, generally is only a defense when specific intent is at issue.”); Hood, 462 P.2d 
at 377; Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal 
Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 STAN. L. REV. 681, 688 n.33 (1983). 
75 Batey, supra note 71, at 344 (citing OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON 
LAW 65–75 (1881)).  For example, attempt is a specific intent crime.  Because the actual 
harm was not completed, there would be no punishment without the concept of specific 
intent.  Id. at 355.  The uncertainty of whether a crime was actually committed is not 
present when the defendant has completed the underlying crime because the completed act 
is itself culpable conduct.  See id. 
76 See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405. 
77 United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978). 
78 Id. 
79 Robinson & Grall, supra note 74, at 694; see also Miguel Angel Méndez, A 
Sisyphean Task: The Common Law Approach to Mens Rea, 28 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 407, 
431–32 (1994) (“Purpose also entails conscious risk creation, but is distinguished from 
knowledge in that an awareness of the consequences that can ensue from the contemplated 
conduct is insufficient to establish liability.  A desire to bring about the consequences is 
indispensable.”). 
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specific intent.80  For example, some courts have decided that the 
definition of specific intent should be limited to only purposeful 
conduct.81  Other courts have decided knowing that a result is 
foreseeable is sufficient to prove specific intent.82  Courts have also 
 
80 The Supreme Court discussed the various definitions of specific intent: 
Sometimes ‘general intent’ is used in the same way as ‘criminal intent’ to mean 
the general notion of mens rea, while ‘specific intent’ is taken to mean the mental 
state required for a particular crime.  Or, ‘general intent’ may be used to 
encompass all forms of the mental state requirement, while ‘specific intent’ is 
limited to the one mental state of intent.  Another possibility is that ‘general 
intent’ will be used to characterize an intent to do something on an undetermined 
occasion, and ‘specific intent’ to denote an intent to do that thing at a particular 
time and place. 
Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., 
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at 201–02 (1972)); see also Liparota v. United 
States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 n.5 (1985) (“We have also recognized that the mental element in 
criminal law encompasses more than the two possibilities of ‘specific’ and ‘general’ 
intent.” (citing Bailey, 444 U.S. at 403–07)); U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at  444–45; 
United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 613 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring); 
Commonwealth of Mass. v. Henson, 476 N.E.2d 947, 954 (Mass. 1985) (Hennessey, C.J., 
concurring) (“But ‘specific intent’ may not have clear meaning to all judges and 
lawyers.”); Hood, 462 P.2d at 377 (“Specific and general intent have been notoriously 
difficult terms to define and apply, and a number of text writers recommend that they be 
abandoned altogether.”). 
81 See, e.g., Callahan v. A.E.V., Inc., 182 F.3d 237, 261 n.15 (3d Cir. 1999) (“Although 
harm to the plaintiffs may have been a probable ultimate consequence of the defendants’ 
actions, we do not think they specifically intended to cause such harm.”); United States v. 
Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995) (“In short, a specific intent crime is one in which 
the defendant acts not only with knowledge of what he is doing, but does so with the 
objective of completing some unlawful act.”); Apodaca v. United States, 188 F.2d 932, 
937 (10th Cir. 1951) (discussing that it was insufficient that the defendants may have had a 
general bad purpose in a prosecution for conspiracy; it was necessary for them to have the 
actual purpose of committing the act alleged in the indictment); Laws v. United States, 66 
F.2d 870, 872 (10th Cir. 1933) (holding that jury instructions on specific intent were 
erroneous when the instructions stated that specific intent could be proved if the defendant 
intended the natural consequences of the knowingly committed wrongful act); State v. 
Daniels, 109 So. 2d 896, 899 (La. 1958) (“[S]pecific intent is present when from the 
circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired the prohibited result; whereas 
general intent exists when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be 
expected to follow from the offender’s voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire 
to have accomplished such result.”); Harris v. State, 728 A.2d 180, 183 (Md. 1999) (“A 
specific intent is not simply the intent to do the immediate act but embraces the 
requirement that the mind be conscious of a more remote purpose or design which shall 
eventuate from the doing of the immediate act.” (quoting Smith v. State, 398 A.2d 426, 
443 (Md. 1979))); State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Minn. 1996) (“[S]pecific intent 
requires that the defendant acted with the intention to produce a specific result, such as is 
the case in premeditated murder.”). 
82 See, e.g., Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 207 (1893) (interpreting a specific 
intent standard and stating “if the act in question is a natural and probable consequence of 
an intended wrongful act, then the unintended wrong may derive its character from the 
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defined specific intent as knowing of the virtual certainty of a result.83  
Still other courts have held that willful blindness84 is sufficient to 
prove specific intent.85 
B.  The Model Penal Code: A Solution to the Specific and General 
Intent Conundrum 
The Supreme Court commented on the task of distinguishing 
between specific and general intent at common law, stating that “[t]he 
administration of the federal system of criminal justice is confided to 
ordinary mortals, whether they be lawyers, judges, or jurors. This 
system could easily fall of its own weight if courts or scholars become 
obsessed with hair-splitting distinctions . . . .”86  Because so much 
ambiguity existed in the lines drawn between specific and general 
intent, the drafters of the Model Penal Code (MPC) moved away from 
this traditional dichotomy of intent in the 1960s.87  The MPC drafters 
 
wrong that was intended”); United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1988) 
(holding that to prove specific intent, “the level of culpability must exceed a mere 
transgression of an objective standard of acceptable behavior (e.g., negligence, 
recklessness)”); United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1979) (“In our 
view, [to prove specific intent] the defendant need only have had knowledge or notice that 
success in his fraud would have likely resulted in an obstruction of justice.  Notice is 
provided by the reasonable foreseeability of the natural and probable consequences of 
one’s acts.”); Commonwealth v. Richards, 293 N.E.2d 854, 860, 860 n.3 (Mass. 1973) 
(reasoning that specific intent to murder could be proved by showing an intent to kill or at 
least knowledge that there was a substantial chance of killing); People v. Lerma, 239 
N.W.2d 424, 426 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (“[I]n order to commit a specific intent crime, an 
offender would have to subjectively desire or know that the prohibited result will occur, 
whereas in a general intent crime, the prohibited result need only be reasonably expected 
to follow from the offender’s voluntary act . . . .”). 
83 See, e.g., State v. Gaines, 873 A.2d 688, 693 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) 
(reasoning that specific intent to murder can be proved through consciously causing death 
or knowing that death is practically certain to result). 
84 “Willful blindness” is only different from positive knowledge in that the defendant 
made a calculated effort to avoid knowing the truth, but it “can almost be said that the 
defendant actually knew.”  United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 n.7 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(quoting GRANVILLE L. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 57, at 159 (2d 
ed. 1961)). 
85 See, e.g., United States v. Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197, 203–04 (4th Cir. 1991); United 
States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114, 1129–30 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Caminos, 770 
F.2d 361, 366 (3d Cir. 1985). 
86 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 406–07 (1980). 
87 Id. at 403 n.4; see also Robinson & Grall, supra note 74, at 705 (“The Model Penal 
Code culpability scheme is a great improvement over ‘the variety, disparity, and 
confusion’ of judicial definitions of ‘the requisite but elusive mental element’ that existed 
prior to its advent.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 
252 (1952))). 
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replaced the “ambiguous and elastic” term “intent” with a hierarchy 
of culpable states of mind.88  The hierarchy includes, from highest to 
lowest degree of culpability, the following states: purposely, 
knowingly, recklessly, and negligently.89  The MPC uses an 
“elemental” approach to criminal law, which requires the prosecution 
to prove each material ingredient of the certain offense with the 
corresponding state of mind.  This approach allows for a separate 
mens rea to be used for each element of an offense.90 
Following the passage of the MPC, specific intent is generally 
understood as an imbedded element of a criminal offense.91  Other 
uses of specific intent, such as defining a heightened level of 
culpability in order to merit a harsher punishment, became obsolete as 
legislatures followed the MPC by defining the precise mens rea of a 
criminal offense.92  Under the “modern view” of mens rea, “it is 
better to draw a distinction between intent (or purpose) on the one 
hand and knowledge on the other.”93  This contrasts with the 
traditional view, which defines specific intent in a way that includes 
purpose and knowledge.94 
The Senate, which ratified the CAT subject to the specific intent 
understanding in 1994, years after the MPC’s passage, never 
discussed using the MPC degrees of culpability to make the torture 
definition more precise.95  It is possible that the Senate intended the 
 
88 Bailey, 444 U.S. at 404; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02, cmt. 2 (1962) 
(describing “specific intent” as an “awkward concept”); Méndez, supra note 79, at 430 
(“A solution to the confusion the common-law terms have created is to adopt the mens rea 
terms conceived by the American Law Institute.”). 
89 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). 
90 DRESSLER, supra note 73, § 10.07, at 149. 
91 See LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2(e), at 354. 
92 See id. § 5.2.  However, despite this “modern view” of mens rea, courts still cling to 
the traditional notions of specific and general intent to define culpability.  See People v. 
Burton, 558 N.E.2d 1369, 1378 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (Steigmann, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (“[R]egrettably the distinction [between general and specific intent] lives on 
because of the courts’ reluctance to give it up.”); see also Kenneth W. Simons, Should the 
Model Penal Code’s Mens Rea Provisions Be Amended?, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 179, 179 
(2003) (“Prior to the MPC, the prevailing mental state categories included general intent 
and specific intent, malice aforethought, and other concepts that were just as confusing.  
And in many states, these confusing and infinitely manipulable old concepts are still with 
us.”).  One scholar has commented that courts continue to define specific and general 
intent, even where states have adopted the MPC hierarchy, because it gives courts more 
flexibility in determining culpability.  Batey, supra note 71, at 402–03. 
93 LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2, at 340. 
94 See id. 
95 See supra Part I.B. 
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definition of torture to contain an implied element that required 
“purposeful” conduct because the torture definition requires the 
defendant to act with the purpose of obtaining a confession, punishing 
the victim, or intimidating the victim, or for any other reason based on 
discrimination of any kind.96  However, the “purpose” language of 
the torture definition is relevant to motive, not intent.97  It also is 
possible that the Senate inserted the specific intent requirement 
merely to clarify that an unintended causation of severe pain or 
suffering is not “torture.”98  The legislative history of the CAT 
ratification does not elucidate what definition of specific intent the 
Senate intended.99 Thus, the BIA and the courts have grappled with 
this antiquated criminal law term and its various meanings.100 
III 
THE BIA’S MISGUIDED APPROACH TO CAT PROTECTION 
The BIA first analyzed the definition of “torture” under the CAT in 
the 2002 In re J-E- case.101  The BIA’s approach to CAT protection, 
particularly its narrow definition of “specific intent,” presents several 
problems, not the least of which is its disregard of established 
criminal law jurisprudence related to the meaning of specific intent.  
In choosing such a limited definition of specific intent, the BIA 
 
96 CAT, supra note 6, art. 1, para. 1, at 113–14; see also CAT REPORT, supra note 14, 
at 14 (“The requirement of intent is emphasized in Article 1 by reference to illustrate 
motives for torture . . . . The purposes given are not exhaustive . . . . Rather, they indicate 
the type of motivation that typically underlies torture, and emphasize the requirement for 
deliberate intention or malice.”). 
97 Perkins, supra note 70, at 921 (“‘Although sometimes confused, motive and intent 
are not synonymous terms.’” (quoting People v. Kuhn, 205 N.W. 188, 189 (1925))). 
98 See CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 14 (“Because specific intent is required, an act 
that results in unanticipated and unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture for 
purposes of this Convention.”); see also CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 10 (Statement of 
Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State) (discussing the concern of 
the Justice Department about clarification of the crime of torture; he states, “We prepared 
a codified proposal which does not raise the high threshold of pain already required under 
international law, but clarifies the definition of mental pain and suffering, and maintains 
the position that specific intent is required for torture”). 
99 See supra Part I.B. 
100 See, e.g., In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (B.I.A. 2002); see also Paul Pierre v. 
Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 189–91 (3d Cir. 2008); Franck Pierre v. Gonzales, 
502 F.3d 109, 116–20 (2d Cir. 2007); Lavira v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 478 F.3d 158, 168–
72 (3d Cir. 2007); Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 139–48 (3d Cir. 2005); Zubeda v. 
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 473–75 (3d Cir. 2003).  In this Article, the first names for 
petitioners Paul Pierre and Franck Pierre are used to distinguish their cases. 
101 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. passim. 
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instituted an approach to Article 3 cases that resembles a prosecution 
of the alleged torturer, not an examination of the harm that the victim 
likely will suffer.  This approach requires an Article 3 applicant to 
engage in the impossible task of proving a government’s purpose 
through a forward-looking prosecution of its future acts.  Thus, the 
specific intent understanding, which was intended to guard U.S. law 
enforcement actions against prosecution for torture, has effectively 
created an impossible hurdle to Article 3 protection. 
A.  In re J-E- 
In In re J-E-, the BIA held that a Haitian man who faced prolonged 
detention in Haiti’s National Penitentiary because of his status as a 
criminal deported from the United States could not obtain deferral of 
removal under the CAT.102  The applicant presented evidence that the 
National Penitentiary was overcrowded and prisoners there were 
deprived of adequate food, water, medical care, sanitation, and 
exercise.103 
The BIA held that the applicant could not prove the Haitian 
authorities specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental 
pain or suffering on criminal deportees by placing them in prisons 
where they would be subjected to these conditions.104  The BIA used 
general criminal law principles to distinguish between specific intent 
and general intent.  “Specific intent” was “defined as the ‘intent to 
accomplish the precise criminal act that one is later charged with’ 
while ‘general intent’ commonly ‘takes the form of recklessness . . . 
or negligence.’”105  Applying this definition of the specific intent 
requirement under the CAT, the BIA found that Haitian authorities 
were intentionally detaining criminal deportees knowing that their 
detention facilities were substandard.  However, that was not enough 
evidence to prove specific intent because there was “no evidence that 
they [were] intentionally and deliberately creating and maintaining 
such prison conditions in order to inflict torture.”106 
 
102 Id. at 304. 
103 Id. at 293. 
104 Id. at 298, 300–01. 
105 Id. at 301 (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 813–14 (7th 
ed. 1999)). 
106 Id. at 301.  In a later decision, the Third Circuit clarified the BIA’s statement in an 
opinion denying CAT relief to a similarly situated applicant.  See Auguste v. Ridge, 395 
F.3d 123, 146 (3d Cir. 2005).  There, the Third Circuit held that it was not necessary for 
the government to intend to inflict torture; the government must only intend to inflict 
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The BIA reasoned that Haiti is an extremely poor country and, 
therefore, it was not the fault of the government if its prison 
conditions were deplorable.107  This reasoning negated the applicant’s 
argument that the government maintained these prisons in a horrible 
state with the specific intent to cause severe pain or suffering to the 
individuals detained.108  The BIA also pointed to evidence 
demonstrating that the Haitian government was trying to improve the 
conditions in its prisons, further negating any specific intent to cause 
severe pain or suffering to its prisoners.109 
The applicant also presented proof of instances of police brutality 
against prisoners, such as burning with cigarettes, choking, hooding, 
ear boxing, and electric shock.110  The BIA held that the deliberate 
and vicious acts of police brutality against the prisoners, which may 
constitute torture, were isolated occurrences.111  There were more 
common acts of rough treatment by the police, but these acts were not 
“severe” enough to rise to the level of torture.112  Therefore, the 
applicant was unable to show a fifty-one percent chance of being 
tortured.113 
 
severe pain or suffering.  See id. (“Section 208.18(a)(5) only requires that the act be 
specifically intended to inflict severe pain and suffering, not that the actor intended to 
commit torture.  The two are distinct and separate inquiries.”). 
107 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 301. 
108 Id. at 299. The BIA also reasoned that the Haitian government’s policy of indefinite 
detention was a lawful sanction and, therefore, could not amount to torture under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.18.  Id. at 301.  The BIA cited the legislative history of the United States’s adoption 
of the CAT and reasoned that the illicit purpose requirement of torture emphasized the 
specific intent requirement.  Id. at 298.  To explain the Haitian authorities’ motivation for 
such indefinite detention, the BIA stated that the policy was “designed ‘to prevent the 
‘bandits’ from increasing the level of insecurity and crime in the country.’”  Id. at 300 
(quoting BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HAITI: COUNTRY REPORTS ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2000 (2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/ 
2000/wha/795.htm).  The BIA also quoted a U.S. State Department official, who wrote 
that Haitian authorities detain criminal deportees “as a warning and deterrent not to 
commit crimes in Haiti.”  Id. (quoting Letter from William E. Dilday, Dir. of Office of 
Country Reports and Asylum Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of State, to Immigration Judge (Apr. 12, 
2001)). 
109 Id. at 301.  The BIA cited the Haitian government’s allowance of groups such as the 
Red Cross to monitor prison conditions and assist prisoners with medical care, food, and 
legal aid.  Id. 
110 Id. at 301–02. 
111 Id. at 302. 
112 The BIA stated that “rough and deplorable treatment, such as police brutality, does 
not amount to torture.”  Id. at 298 (citing CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 13–14). 
113 Id. at 303.  The BIA also interpreted the “more likely than not” standard of the CAT 
in the case In re J-F-F-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 912 (B.I.A. 2006).  In In re J-F-F-, the BIA held 
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B.  In re J-E- Ignores Criminal Law Precedent on Specific Intent 
The BIA’s narrow definition of specific intent in the In re J-E- 
decision disregarded significant criminal law jurisprudence on the 
meaning of specific intent.  Many courts, including the Supreme 
Court, have decided that the definition of specific intent should not be 
limited to only purposeful conduct.114  In the 1978 case United States 
v. United States Gypsum Co.,115 the Court addressed whether the 
Sherman Antitrust Act required a mens rea for a conviction under the 
 
that a Dominican man was ineligible for deferral of removal under the CAT because he 
could not show that he would more likely than not suffer torture.  Id. at 921.  The 
respondent argued that upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he might not be able to 
take his psychiatric medications, which would cause him to become “rowdy” and lead the 
Dominican police to arrest him; he then argued it was likely that he would be tortured in 
jail.  Id. at 916–17.  The BIA held that an applicant for protection under the CAT could not 
string together a series of suppositions to meet the burden of proof when the applicant 
could not show that each step in the hypothetical chain of events was more likely than not 
to occur.  Id. at 921.  Because the applicant in In re J-F-F- could not show a fifty-one 
percent likelihood that each event in the chain would result in his torture in jail, he was not 
granted CAT relief.  See id. 
114 See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987); United States v. U.S. Gypsum 
Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978); United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Buffalano, 727 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1979); see also United States v. Johnson, 24 
M.J. 101, 105 (C.M.A. 1987) (interpreting specific intent in a sabotage case and stating 
that the “limited distinction between knowledge and purpose has not been considered 
important since ‘there is good reason for imposing liability whether the defendant desired 
or merely knew of the practical certainty of the results’ . . . . In either circumstance, the 
defendants are consciously behaving in a way the law prohibits, and such conduct is a 
fitting object of criminal punishment.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting LAFAVE & 
SCOTT, JR., supra note 80, § 28, at 197)).  Scholars have also agreed that specific intent 
should not be limited to purposeful conduct.  See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 73, § 10.04, 
at 130 (“At common law, a person ‘intentionally’ causes the social harm of an offense if: 
(1) it is his desire (i.e., his conscious object) to cause the social harm; or (2) he acts with 
knowledge that the social harm is virtually certain to occur as a result of his conduct.” 
(footnote omitted)); Batey, supra note 71, at 358, 368–69, 402 (commenting that specific 
intent is often equated with willful, knowing, or purposeful acts; whereas, general intent is 
commonly equated with recklessness, which means the perpetrator was aware of the risk 
of bringing about the result prohibited by the statute, but nevertheless chose to run that 
risk); Perkins, supra note 70, at 911 (“Intended consequences include those which (a) 
represent the very purpose for which an act is done (regardless of likelihood of 
occurrence), or (b) are known to be substantially certain to result (regardless of desire).”).  
In the criminal law treatise SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW, which is frequently cited by 
courts, Wayne R. LaFave states: “Intent has traditionally been defined to include 
knowledge, and thus it is usually said that one intends certain consequences when he 
desires that his acts cause those consequences or knows that those consequences are 
substantially certain to result from his acts.”  LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2, at 340. 
115 U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978). 
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statute.116  Having concluded that intent was a necessary element of a 
criminal antitrust violation,117 the Court decided that the offense 
contained a specific intent mens rea,118 which the prosecution could 
prove by demonstrating the defendant’s knowledge of the anticipated 
consequences of various actions.119  The Court held that “[a] 
requirement of proof not only of this knowledge of likely effects, but 
also of a conscious desire to bring them to fruition or to violate the 
law would seem . . . both unnecessarily cumulative and unduly 
burdensome.”120 
 
116 Id. at 434–43.  The defendants were charged with violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1 for 
engaging in collusion and conspiracy to raise, fix, maintain, and stabilize the prices of their 
product and the terms and conditions of sale thereof, while also trying to adopt and 
maintain uniform methods of packaging and handling their product.  Id. at 427. 
117 Id. at 443. 
118 Id. at 443 n.20, 444. 
119 Id. at 446.  Justice Stevens, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed with 
this definition of specific intent, stating, “If I were fashioning a new test of criminal 
liability, I would require proof of a specific purpose to violate the law rather than mere 
knowledge that the defendants’ agreement has had an adverse effect on the market.”  Id. at 
474–75 (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). 
120 Id. at 446.  The Court reasoned that the limited distinction between knowledge and 
purpose is not important because “‘there is good reason for imposing liability whether the 
defendant desired or merely knew of the practical certainty of the results.’”  Id. at 445 
(quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, JR., supra note 80, § 28, at 197).  The Supreme Court 
affirmed its reasoning in United States Gypsum Co. in the 1979 Sandstrom v. Montana 
decision.  442 U.S. 510 (1979).  In Sandstrom, the Court, deciding an appeal of a 
deliberate homicide conviction, held that a jury instruction indicating that “the law 
presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts” violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment due process requirement, which obligates the State to prove 
every element of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 512, 522–26.  The 
State argued that, because the jury was instructed to find that a person “intends” the 
ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts but was not provided with a definition of 
“intends,” the jurors could have interpreted the intentional requirement as referring only to 
the defendant’s “purpose” and would not have needed to rely upon the tainted 
presumption.  Id. at 525.  Rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that 
we are not at all certain that a jury would interpret the word “intends” as bearing 
solely upon purpose.  As we stated in [United States Gypsum Co.], “[t]he element 
of intent in the criminal law has traditionally been viewed as a bifurcated concept 
embracing either the specific requirement of purpose or the more general one of 
knowledge or awareness.” 
Id. at 525–26 (quoting U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 445); see also United States v. 
Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1274 (4th Cir. 1979) (“[A] rule focusing on foreseeable, 
rather than intended, consequences operates in sensible and fair fashion to deter the 
conduct sought to be avoided and to punish those whose actions are blameworthy, even 
though undertaken for purposes that may or may not be culpable.”). 
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In 1987, in Tison v. Arizona,121 the Court discussed the meaning of 
specific intent in the context of whether the death penalty was a 
proportional punishment for a felony murder defendant.122  The Court 
stated that “[t]raditionally, ‘one intends certain consequences when he 
desires that his acts cause those consequences or knows that those 
consequences are substantially certain to result from his acts.’”123  In 
Tison, the Supreme Court decided that the Eighth Amendment did not 
prohibit a state from imposing the death penalty on a defendant 
convicted of felony murder whose mental state was reckless 
indifference to human life.124  The Tison Court addressed whether 
“reckless indifference” proved “specific intent to kill,” which was 
required to justify the imposition of the death penalty under Enmund 
v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). The Tison Court stated: 
Enmund held that when “intent to kill” results in its logical though 
not inevitable consequence—the taking of human life—the Eighth 
Amendment permits the State to exact the death penalty after a 
careful weighing of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.  
Similarly, we hold that the reckless disregard for human life 
implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry 
a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a 
mental state that may be taken into account in making a capital 
sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though 
also not inevitable, lethal result.125 
The majority in Tison used a broader definition of specific intent 
notwithstanding its 1980 decision in United States v. Bailey,126 where 
 
121 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
122 Id. at 149–50. 
123 Id. at 150 (quoting LAFAVE & SCOTT, JR., supra note 80, § 28, at 196). 
124 Id. at 158.  The Court stated that “reckless indifference to the value of human life 
may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an ‘intent to kill.’”  Id. at 157. 
125 Id. at 157–58.  Several Justices in Tison, namely Justices Brennan, Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, disagreed, stating in a dissenting opinion both that specific intent 
could only be proved if the accused chose to kill and that anything less was merely 
reckless conduct, which would not merit the death penalty as punishment.  Id. at 170–71 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (reasoning that a person who chooses to act recklessly and is 
indifferent to the possibility of fatal consequences often deserves serious punishment, but 
because that person has not specifically chosen to kill, the moral and criminal culpability is 
of a different degree than that of one who killed or intended to kill); see also id. at 172  
(“Since I would hold that death may not be inflicted for killings consistent with the Eighth 
Amendment without a finding that the defendant engaged in conduct with the conscious 
purpose of producing death, these sentences must be set aside.” (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 
438 U.S. 586, 628 (1978) (White, J., dissenting))). 
126 444 U.S. 394 (1980).  In Bailey, the Supreme Court decided whether the crime of 
escape under 18 U.S.C. § 751(a) was a general or specific intent crime.  Id. at 408.  In the 
case, the defense both presented evidence that the defendant had escaped from jail to avoid 
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the Supreme Court stated that “‘purpose’ corresponds loosely with the 
common-law concept of specific intent, while ‘knowledge’ 
corresponds loosely with the concept of general intent.”127  Thus, the 
BIA’s definition of specific intent, which is limited to only purposeful 
conduct, ignores significant Supreme Court precedent and a large 
body of criminal jurisprudence.128 
C.  The In re J-E- Analysis Focuses on the Torturer, not the Victim 
In In re J-E-, the BIA’s narrow definition of specific intent 
established an approach to Article 3 CAT protection cases that 
focuses on the intent of the government official, not the harm to the 
victim.  The BIA’s holding may have reflected a concern that an 
expansive reading of specific intent in an Article 3 case would later 
impact prosecutions of U.S. law enforcement officials under the 
criminal provisions of the CAT.  Many provisions of the CAT address 
the prevention and prosecution of torture carried out by law 
enforcement,129 which prompted the United States to include a 
 
beatings and homosexual attacks and argued that the defendant did not have the specific 
intent to avoid confinement, as required by the statute.  Id.  The majority held that the 
prosecution need only prove general intent to convict under the escape statute, which the 
prosecution had accomplished in the case by proving that the escapee knew his actions 
would result in his leaving physical confinement without permission.  Id. at 408–09. 
127 Id. at 405.  The Supreme Court appeared to move away from the traditional specific 
intent definition, which previously included both “purposeful” and “knowing” conduct.  
See id.  However, the Bailey Court stated that the line drawn between purpose and 
knowledge was “[p]erhaps the most significant, and most esoteric.”  Id. at 404.  In 1994, 
the Supreme Court reasoned that “specific intent” means “a purpose to disobey the law” in 
Ratzlaf v. United States.  510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994).  In Ratzlaf, the Supreme Court did not 
elaborate on the varying definitions of specific and general intent in criminal law 
jurisprudence.  The Court, interpreting a statute that punished willful violations of an 
antistructuring provision, held that “willfulness” required “both ‘knowledge of the 
reporting requirement’ and a ‘specific intent to commit the crime,’ i.e., ‘a purpose to 
disobey the law.’”  Id. (quoting United States v. Bank of New Eng., 821 F.2d 844, 854–59 
(1st Cir. 1987)); see also United States v. Eisenstein, 731 F.2d 1540, 1543 (11th Cir. 
1984). 
128 See Tison, 481 U.S. at 157; United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 442, 446 
(1978); United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Buffalano, 727 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 
1273 (4th Cir. 1979). 
129 See, e.g., CAT, supra note 6, art. 2, para. 1, at 114 (“Each State Party shall take 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in 
any territory under its jurisdiction.”); id. art. 4, para. 1, at 114 (“Each State Party shall 
ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.”); id. art. 9, para. 1, at 
115 (“States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in 
connection with criminal proceedings brought in respect of any of the offences referred to 
in article 4 . . . .”).  However, the history of the CAT indicates the UN General Assembly, 
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specific intent understanding.130  Only Article 3 pertains to protecting 
a victim.  The CAT also was the first human rights instrument to 
define “torture,” although the prohibition of torture appears in several 
treaties and has developed into a rule of customary international 
law.131  However, the drafters of the CAT did not wish this definition 
to be “understood as a definition in the strict sense of penal law . . . 
[Article 1] gives a description of torture for the purpose of 
understanding and implementing the Convention rather than a legal 
definition for direct application in criminal law and criminal 
procedure.”132  Nonetheless, the United States clearly saw the CAT as 
a codification of the crime of torture and the nation’s primary concern 
was protecting its troops from prosecution.133  This approach to the 
CAT trickled down to the BIA’s interpretation of Article 3 of the 
treaty in In re J-E-, which effectively turned Article 3 protection 
hearings into trials of the alleged torturer. 
In a criminal prosecution, the specific intent query focuses on the 
intent of the defendant, not the harm to the victim.134  While this is an 
appropriate analysis for prosecuting torturers,135 it does not consider 
the victim’s viewpoint, which is an essential component of a human 
 
when it requested the UN Congress to focus on the issue of torture, sought to develop a 
code of ethics for law enforcement agencies in addition to protecting prisoners from 
torture.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 14–15. 
130 See CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 14–15. 
131 See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 10–12. 
132 Id. at 122.  The drafters were concerned that to define torture as “a crime by using an 
open-ended list of purposes might give rise to the objection that this definition would run 
counter to a strict application of the principle ‘nullum crimen sine lege’ (no crime, no 
punishment without a previous law).”  Id. 
133 See CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 1–4 (statements of Sen. Jesse Helms, Sen. Larry 
Pressler and Hon. Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State); id. at 16 
(statement of Mark Richard, Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice). 
134 In a “victim-centered approach” to criminal law, the victim’s concerns often arise 
when determining the punishment for the crime, not when a court determines whether the 
defendant had the requisite mens rea to commit the offense.  See, e.g., Stacy Caplow, What 
If There Is No Client?: Prosecutors as “Counselors” of Crime Victims, 5 CLINICAL L. 
REV. 1, 40 (1998) (“Victims’ voices have been heard loudest at sentencing, although not 
without controversy.”); Douglas J. Sylvester, Myth in Restorative Justice History, 2003 
UTAH L. REV. 471, 505–10. 
135 See Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from 
Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179, 1228–30 (1994) (arguing that criminal 
law cases appropriately focus on the intent of the defendant because “‘only conscious 
wrongdoing constitutes crime’”; whereas tort, antidiscrimination, and refugee law focus on 
providing a remedy for the victim (quoting 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 129 (1981))). 
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rights protection case.136  Previous human rights instruments inspired 
Article 3 of the CAT;137 these instruments both provide a set of rules 
for the relationship between the individual and the appropriate 
government and contemplate “that this relationship must . . . be based 
upon rights of the individual which entail obligations on the part of 
the government.”138  For example, the Refugee Convention should 
not be interpreted to be a criminal prosecution of the persecutor.139  
Because the rights of the individual are of utmost importance in 
human rights protection, the inquiry should be: What is the harm to 
the individual?  The question should not be: Is the government 
official guilty of a crime? 
The BIA also did not acknowledge an obvious parallel between 
Article 3 protection under the CAT and the Torture Victim Protection 
Act (TVPA) of 1991,140 an entirely victim-focused piece of 
legislation that Congress debated and passed during the same time 
period it ratified the CAT.141  The TVPA, which allowed victims of 
 
136 See Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic 
Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 328 (1994) (concluding that 
focusing on the alleged torturer and the tortious act draws attention away from the victim’s 
suffering); Rebecca B. Schechter, Intentional Starvation as Torture: Exploring the Gray 
Area Between Ill-Treatment and Torture, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1233, 1263 (2003) 
(arguing that a more accurate test for a court to employ to determine the pain or suffering 
requirement is to objectively measure the extent of the harm endured by the victim).  
Professor Karen Musalo highlighted this problem in U.S. interpretations of asylum law, 
which she labeled “intent-based,” not “effects-based,” because of the overriding focus on 
the motivation of the persecutor rather than on the harm to the victim. Musalo, supra note 
135, at 1181–82.  She stated: 
An intent-based analysis of the phrase ‘on account of’ would require a showing 
that the persecutor was motivated to harm the victim because of the victim’s 
status or beliefs.  An effects-based analysis would allow the victim to prevail 
upon a showing that he or she suffered because of his or her status or beliefs, 
whether or not he or she could prove the persecutor’s motivation.  The [BIA] . . . 
appeared to adopt an intent-based analysis almost from the outset. 
Id. at 1186 (footnote omitted). 
137 See BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 125–26. 
138 Id. at 5. 
139 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has stated that “refugee status examiners 
are not called upon to decide the criminal guilt or liability of the persecutor, and refugee 
status is not dependent on such proof.”  Brief for the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 16, INS v. Elias-
Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992) (No. 90-1342), 1991 WL 11003948. 
140 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). 
141 See id.; see also The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991: Hearings and Markup 
on H.R. 1417 Before the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs and the Subcomm. on Human 
Rights and Int’l Orgs., 100th Cong. (1988) [hereinafter TVPA Hearings]. 
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torture, or their representatives residing in the United States, to bring 
a civil action in federal court against the torturer,142 sought to carry 
out “obligations of the United States under the U.N. Charter, as well 
as other international agreements pertaining to the protection of 
human rights.”143  The TVPA used virtually the same definition of 
torture as the CAT, yet there was no specific intent requirement.144  
Congress therefore decided, during the same time it was ratifying the 
CAT, that victims of torture only needed to prove intentional 
causation of severe pain or suffering, not “specific intent.”145  Yet the 
BIA, when it interpreted Article 3, the only victim-based article in the 
CAT, seemingly forgot about victims and focused on prosecuting 
torturers. 
To demonstrate this problem with the BIA’s approach, a court 
interpreting Jean Etienne’s case will focus on the Haitian officials’ 
plans or motives when they detain him.  His likely level of suffering 
in the Haitian prison will be irrelevant to his CAT protection case.  
Thus, despite the Haitian government’s intentional imprisonment of 
 
142 TVPA Hearings, supra note 141, at 1 (statement of Rep. Gus Yatron). 
143 Id. 
144 See § 3(b), 106 Stat. at 73–74.  The legislative history of the TVPA indicates that the 
definition of “torture” was intended to include withholding food or water from prisoners.  
During a hearing on the TVPA, one Congressman stated: 
We know that hunger is often one of the choice weapons used in many of the 
prisons, particularly in the Soviet Union and elsewhere, including in Cuba.  
Would that fall in line with the definition [of torture] as stated by the legislation? 
. . . I do raise that because, again, one of the weapons used most often by the 
forced labor camps in the Soviet Union—and we have, I think, very good 
documentation on this—is lack of food or lack of water, but it is particularly lack 
of food.  That, coupled with excessive work, causes very deleterious impact upon 
the people, very often leading to death.  I would hope that that would be part of 
[the definition of torture]. 
TVPA Hearings, supra note 141, at 74 (statement of Rep. Chris Smith). 
145 See §§ 2–3, 106 Stat. at 73–74.  Under the TVPA torture definition, a government’s 
acts such as starving, refusing medications, and providing inadequate toilet facilities to a 
prisoner can amount to torture; these acts were held to be torture when committed by the 
Iraqi government.  See Daliberti v. Republic of Iraq, 146 F. Supp. 2d 19, 22–25 (D.D.C. 
2001) (interpreting the TVPA definition of torture because it is incorporated into the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which “exempts from immunity foreign 
sovereigns where ‘money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or 
death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage 
taking, or the provision of material support or resources . . . for such an act’” (quoting 28 
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006))); see also Nikbin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 471 F. Supp. 2d 
53, 62–63 (D.D.C. 2007) (interpreting the TVPA definition of torture in a FSIA exemption 
case and stating “[d]etention can itself constitute torture,” but yet holding that petitioner 
did not suffer torture because he did not allege that the conditions of confinement caused 
severe pain or suffering). 
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Etienne without food, water, or life-saving medication, he cannot win 
CAT protection solely by demonstrating that severe pain, suffering, 
and probable death will await him in the Haitian prison. 
D.   BIA’s Specific Intent Definition Is Unworkable in a 
Forward-Looking Context 
Another problem with the BIA’s approach is that Article 3 
applicants must prove the narrow definition of specific intent in a 
prospective case.  Specific intent, as a criminal law concept, is usually 
proved in a criminal prosecution, during which the fact finder has the 
benefit of making inferences based on past conduct.146  However, “it 
would be difficult, if not impossible, to prove specific intent in a 
prospective context.”147  The CAT applicant has no tools, such as 
depositions, interrogatories, or cross-examinations at trial, to ask the 
potential torturer about intent.148  Rather, adjudicators must make 
predictions about future states of mind; the only guidance is a 
regulation that urges immigration judges to rely upon the type of 
information normally used to determine intent, such as evidence of 
past torture or other violations of human rights.149  If evidence of past 
conduct is unavailable, an immigration judge must consider “‘all 
evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture.’”150 
Jean Etienne, who fears future torture yet has not been subjected to 
past torture, must act as a prosecutor of a future crime that he claims 
 
146 See Lavira v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 478 F.3d 158, 171 (3d Cir. 2007); In re J-E-, 23 
I. & N. Dec. 291, 312–13 (B.I.A. 2002) (Rosenberg, dissenting). 
147 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 316 (Rosenberg, dissenting). 
148 Professor Karen Musalo highlighted this problem of prospectively proving the 
motivation of a persecution in the asylum context.  See Musalo, supra note 135, at 1202.  
CAT applicants have more of an uphill battle than asylum seekers, however, because CAT 
applicants must prove their government will specifically intend to cause them severe pain 
or suffering, while asylum seekers must only prove that a protected ground is a central 
reason for the persecution.  Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the 
Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, div. B, § 101(a)(3), 
119 Stat. 231, 303; In re J-B-N- & S-M-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 211 (B.I.A. 2007) 
(confirming that noncitizens whose persecutors were motivated by more than one reason 
will continue to be protected despite the provisions of Public Law Number 109-13). 
149 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (2009). 
150 Lavira, 478 F.3d at 171 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3) (2009)).  Article 3 of the 
CAT also states that, for the purpose of determining whether there are substantial grounds 
for believing the applicant would be in danger of being subject to torture, “the competent 
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, 
the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights.”  CAT, supra note 6, art. 3, para. 2, at 114. 
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will be committed against him.  While human rights reports can be 
useful to prove past acts by his government, these reports are of 
limited assistance to Etienne, who must prove that Haitian officials 
will specifically intend to cause him severe pain or suffering by 
detaining him in atrocious prison conditions.151 
IV 
FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURTS TORTURE THE DEFINITION OF SPECIFIC 
INTENT IN CAT PROTECTION CASES 
Because of the specific intent requirement, courts interpreting CAT 
protection have largely focused on criminal law jurisprudence.152  
There are no reported prosecutions under the criminal provisions of 
the CAT,153 which are codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A,154 
despite the addition of the specific intent language to clarify the 
definition of torture for such prosecutions.155  However, there are 
numerous cases interpreting Article 3 of the CAT,156 and, as 
 
151 Compounding the problem is the fact that applicants are often represented pro se 
because persons in removal proceedings do not have the right to a court-appointed 
attorney.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006).  In addition, many CAT applicants are 
subject to mandatory detention because of their criminal offenses, which makes it difficult 
to obtain pro bono assistance.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2006).  These factors are 
exacerbated due to the shorter calendar for these cases, which gives a detainee even less 
time to prepare defenses to removal.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION 
COURT PRACTICE MANUAL § 9.1(e), at 121–22 (2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (noting that proceedings for detained noncitizens 
are expedited). 
152 See, e.g., Paul Pierre v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 528 F.3d 180, 189–91 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Franck Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 116–20 (2d Cir. 2007); Lavira, 478 F.3d at 168–
72; Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 139–48 (3d Cir. 2005); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 
463, 473–75 (3d Cir. 2003). 
153 The only reported decision discussing either statute is United States v. Chanthadara, 
in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that the definition of 
“torture” under 18 U.S.C. § 2340 did not apply to the definition of “torture” used in the 
jury instructions for death penalty cases under 18 U.S.C. 3592(c)(6).  United States v. 
Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1262 (10th Cir. 2000).  The Office of Legal Counsel of the 
DOJ interpreted the specific intent requirement in several memos.  See infra Part V.B. 
154 18 U.S.C. § 2340A makes it a criminal offense for any person outside of the United 
States to commit or attempt to commit torture. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (2006).  18 U.S.C. § 
2340 defines an act of torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of 
law specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than 
pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or 
physical control.”  18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2006). 
155 See CAT Hearing, supra note 57, at 16 (statement of Mark Richard, Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice); CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 14–15. 
156 See, e.g., Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189–91; Franck Pierre, 502 F.3d at 116–20; 
Lavira, 478 F.3d at 168–72; Auguste, 395 F.3d at 139–48; Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 473–75. 
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discussed above, courts interpreting Article 3 have to grapple with 
“specific intent,” an antiquated criminal law term with varying 
definitions. 
Courts interpreting CAT protection have frequently shifted the 
focal point: in some cases, courts focus entirely on the intent of the 
torturer, but in others courts examine the harm the CAT applicant will 
suffer.  As illustrated below, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit has been vacillating between these two focal points in recent 
years.  Each time the court shifted focus, it would revise its definition 
of specific intent.  The reasoning in these cases, in addition to other 
solutions created by courts, demonstrates courts’ conflicting views of 
whether CAT protection should be interpreted through the eyes of the 
victim or the torturer. 
A.  The Third Circuit Alternates Viewpoints 
Zubeda v. Ashcroft157 illustrates a victim-focused analysis of the 
CAT.  In the 2003 Zubeda opinion, the Third Circuit decided the case 
of a woman from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) who 
sought protection under the CAT, fearing that she would be detained 
by her government as a deportee and raped by prison guards.158  The 
court reasoned that the specific intent requirement, as interpreted by 
the BIA in In re J-E-, would “impose insurmountable obstacles to 
affording the very protections the community of nations sought to 
guarantee under the Convention Against Torture.”159  The court 
stated that, “[a]lthough the regulations require that severe pain or 
suffering be ‘intentionally inflicted,’ we do not interpret this as a 
‘specific intent’ requirement.”160  The court reasoned that the 
regulations distinguish suffering that is the accidental result of an 
intended act (not torture) from suffering that is purposefully inflicted 
or the foreseeable consequence of deliberate conduct (torture).161  
 
157 Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 463. 
158 The immigration judge had denied her asylum claim because of her inconsistent 
testimony regarding her past persecution, but the judge granted her relief under the CAT 
because of the likelihood of her detention in the DRC upon arrival and the possibility of 
rape at the hands of the detaining authorities.  Id. at 470.  The BIA overruled the 
immigration judge’s ruling, citing In re J-E-.  Id. at 475. 
159 Id. at 474. 
160 Id. at 473 (internal citation omitted). 
161 Id.  The court examined the specific intent requirement at 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) 
and noted that this requirement is immediately qualified by the phrase “‘[a]n act that 
results in unanticipated or unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture.’”  Id. 
(alteration in original) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(5) (2009)). 
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Therefore, the regulations exclude only pain or suffering that is the 
unintended consequence of an intentional act from torture.162  
According to the court’s holding, foreseeable suffering from an 
intentional act would be torture under the CAT.163 
While CAT applicants readily cited the court’s reasoning in 
Zubeda, the Third Circuit decided, two years later, to look at the CAT 
as a treaty designed only to prosecute torturers.164  In the 2005 
Auguste v. Ridge decision, the Third Circuit denied CAT protection 
for a Haitian man who feared the prison conditions that he would 
suffer as a criminal deportee.165  Reasoning that its specific intent 
language in Zubeda was merely dicta,166 the court decided that, “in 
the context of the Convention, for an act to constitute torture, there 
must be a showing that the actor had the intent to commit the act as 
well as the intent to achieve the consequences of the act, namely the 
infliction of the severe pain and suffering.”167  The court clearly 
stated its focus when interpreting CAT protection: “Auguste’s 
contention that the introduction of criminal law concepts into the 
standard for relief under the Convention was in error because the 
Convention is not about criminal prosecution, but rather about 
protecting the victims of torture, is besides the point.”168  Relying on 
one criminal law case and the BIA’s reasoning in In re J-E-, the 
Auguste court defined specific intent as “expressly intend[ing] to 
achieve the forbidden act.”169 
 
162 Id.; see also DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 465, 
486 (3d ed. 1999) (citing BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 41).  For example, if 
severe pain or suffering is inflicted in the course of a fully justified medical treatment, this 
is not “torture” under the CAT.  BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 24, at 119. 
163 Zubeda, 333 F.3d at 473. 
164 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 145 (3d Cir. 2005). 
165 Id. at 154–55.  When presented with facts more similar to In re J-E- (i.e., an 
applicant who was convicted of a crime, feared return to Haiti, and did not present himself 
as a vulnerable rape victim as in Zubeda), it appears that the Third Circuit was willing to 
backpedal from its specific intent reasoning.  See id. at 145–48.  But cf. Zubeda, 333 F.3d 
at 470–74 (detailing the Third Circuit’s specific intent reasoning prior to Auguste). 
166 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 148. 
167 Id. at 145–46. 
168 Id. at 145 (emphasis added). 
169 Id. (citing Carter v. United States, 530 U.S. 255, 269 (2000)).  In Carter, the Court 
decided whether 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), which punished larceny from a bank, was a lesser 
included offense of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), which punished robbery from a bank.  Carter, 
530 U.S. at 258–59.  The Court held that the larceny statute section had a specific intent 
mens rea and the robbery section contained only a general intent mens rea.  Id. at 269–70.  
The petitioner argued that the Court should read in a specific intent mens rea to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2113(b), and thus, the elements of the two offenses would align, making the larceny 
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The Third Circuit again interpreted the CAT as a victim-centric 
human rights instrument in the 2007 Lavira v. Attorney General of the 
United States opinion.170  Here, the court decided the case of a 
wheelchair-bound, above-the-knee amputee who suffered from AIDS 
and feared return to the horrendous prison conditions in Haiti that he 
would suffer as a criminal deportee.171  An expert reported that the 
victim would not receive any meaningful medical treatment and 
would probably lose thirty pounds shortly after his incarceration, 
which would lead to death.172  The court reasoned that severe pain 
was not a possible consequence that could result from placing him in 
the facility; it was the only foreseeable outcome.173  Based on this 
record, the Third Circuit decided that Lavira had proved specific 
intent and merited CAT protection.174  In Lavira, the court cited 
criminal law for a more generous definition of specific intent that 
would effectuate the goals of CAT protection and held that specific 
intent could mean “willful blindness.”175 
 
crime a lesser included offense of the robbery crime.  Id. at 270.  Despite this argument, 
the Supreme Court held that the presumption in favor of scienter in a statute demands that 
courts only read in a general intent requirement, not a specific intent requirement.  Id. at 
268.  The Court cited a nontypical prosecution scenario to demonstrate the difference 
between specific and general intent.  In this scenario, a person enters a bank and takes 
money from the teller at gunpoint, but the violator deliberately fails to make a quick 
getaway “in the hope of being arrested” to return to prison and be treated for alcoholism.  
Id. (citing United States v. Lewis, 628 F.2d 1276, 1279 (10th Cir. 1980)).  The 
hypothetical criminal knowingly engages in the act of using force and taking money, so 
the general intent requirement is satisfied.  However, the criminal does not intend to 
permanently deprive the bank of its money, so the requisite specific intent is not met.  Id.  
The dissent noted that a defendant exhibiting this kind of “bizarre behavior” would 
probably have specific intent to steal and further noted that this sort of case is an anomaly 
because such indictments are brought no more than once a year.  Id. at 283–84 (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting) (quoting Lewis, 628 F.2d at 1278).  Other than citing this nontypical 
scenario, the Supreme Court’s decision in Carter has little value in determining the 
definition of specific intent. 
170 478 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2007). 
171 Id. at 159.  The applicant’s conviction for purchasing a ten-dollar bag of drugs for an 
undercover agent would classify him as a criminal deportee deserving of indefinite 
detention.  Id. at 159, 170. 
172 Id. at 170–71. 
173 Id. at 170. 
174 Id. at 170–72. 
175 Id. at 171 (citing United States v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985)); see 
also Thelemaque v. Ashcroft, 363 F. Supp. 2d 198, 215 (D. Conn. 2005) (“[A] mechanical 
application of the specific intent requirement might yield results at odds with the language 
and intent of CAT and . . . concepts such as deliberate indifference, reckless disregard or 
willful blindness might well suffice in certain circumstances to satisfy the specific intent 
requirement of the Convention.”). 
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In 2008, an en banc panel of the Third Circuit adopted a strictly 
criminal prosecution view of the CAT in Paul Pierre v. Attorney 
General of the United States.176  The applicant, who suffered from 
esophageal dysphagia, feared the Haitian prison conditions, in which 
he could not survive without his mandatory liquid diet administered 
through a feeding tube.177  Holding that its reasoning in Lavira was 
merely dicta,178 the court decided to define specific intent as narrowly 
as possible in CAT protection cases.179  The court stated, 
Specific intent requires not simply the general intent to accomplish 
an act with no particular end in mind, but the additional deliberate 
and conscious purpose of accomplishing a specific and prohibited 
result.  Mere knowledge that a result is substantially certain to 
follow from one’s actions is not sufficient to form the specific intent 
to torture.180 
Rather, the Third Circuit stated that “[k]nowledge that pain and 
suffering will be the certain outcome of conduct may be sufficient for 
a finding of general intent but it is not enough for a finding of specific 
intent.”181  The court refused to focus on the applicant’s suffering, 
perhaps because the court found the petitioner unsympathetic, 
 
176 528 F.3d 180, 190–91 (3d Cir. 2008). 
177 Id. at 183.  The court stated it was an undisputed fact that Haitian prison officials 
would not be able to provide him with his liquid diet and regular medical attention.  Id. at 
183 n.3.  The court also stated, “It is not clear from the record how long [Paul] Pierre 
would remain imprisoned once returned to Haiti.”  Id. 
178 The Third Circuit explained that, in Lavira, the applicant had demonstrated he 
would be targeted and singled out by the prison guards in Haiti because of his HIV status.  
Id. at 188.  The court characterized its own discussion about willful blindness proving 
specific intent in Lavira as mere dicta.  Id.  The concurring opinion in Paul Pierre noted 
that the court’s decision in Lavira, which examined an applicant whom the majority 
agreed had proved all of the elements of a CAT claim, allowed for proof of specific intent 
“in the form of the prison official’s knowledge that severe pain and suffering would 
certainly result.”  Id. at 191–92 (Rendell, J., concurring).  Thus, the legal reasoning of the 
Third Circuit’s decision in Paul Pierre did not comport with its decision to allow any 
portion of the Lavira holding on specific intent to stand.  See id. 
179 See id. at 190 (majority opinion). 
180 Id. at 189. 
181 Id.  In Franck Pierre, the Second Circuit looked at the CAT entirely as a criminal 
prosecution treaty, yet the court left the door open for a broader reading of specific intent 
compared to the BIA’s definition.  Franck Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2007). 
Declining to the give “specific intent” a “counter-intuitive spin,” the court examined the 
various definitions of “specific intent” in CAT protection cases and found a middle ground 
between Lavira and Paul Pierre: the Second Circuit reasoned that specific intent could be 
proved “if it is found on the record evidence that the actor is aware of a virtual certainty 
that such pain and suffering will result.”  Id. at 118 n.6; see also id. at 116–19. 
 2009] Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim Protection 811 
referring to his physical ailment as “self-imposed.”182  The court 
stated that the lack of medical care and likely pain that Paul Pierre 
would experience was “an unfortunate but unintended consequence of 
the poor conditions in the Haitian prisons, which exist because of 
Haiti’s extreme poverty.  We find that this unintended consequence is 
not the type of proscribed purpose contemplated by the CAT.”183 
Many of the applicants for CAT relief have been Haitians, like 
Jean Etienne, who fear the severe pain or suffering that will result 
when they are detained as criminal deportees in Haiti.184  Although 
the BIA and circuit courts did not want to open the floodgates by 
protecting criminal deportees from Haiti,185 it became more difficult 
for adjudicators to imagine an applicant returning to Haiti, as they 
were exposed to the reality of conditions in the Haitian prisons, 
especially when that applicant seemed particularly vulnerable due to a 
medical ailment.186  Also contributing to this trend is more thorough 
 
182 Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 182.  In Paul Pierre, the Third Circuit was not presented 
with facts as sympathetic as the applicant in Lavira, the wheelchair-bound, double 
amputee, and HIV-positive Haitian CAT applicant with a minor criminal record, or 
Zubeda, the Congolese applicant who feared rape in the prison and had no criminal record.  
See Lavira v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 478 F.3d 158, 170 (3d Cir. 2007); Zubeda v. 
Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 467, 470 (3d Cir. 2003).  The applicant for CAT relief in Paul 
Pierre had repeatedly stabbed his ex-girlfriend with a meat cleaver and earned a 
conviction for attempted murder that rendered him removable.  Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 
183.  His physical ailment, which the Third Circuit called “self-imposed,” resulted from 
his attempt to commit suicide by swallowing battery acid after the stabbing.  Id. at 182–83. 
183 Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 189. 
184 These Haitians may only seek relief from removal under the CAT because they 
cannot prove persecution “on account of” their race, religion, nationality, political opinion, 
or membership in a particular social group.  Also, deferral of removal under the CAT is 
the only relief for which many are eligible because their criminal convictions bar them 
from seeking asylum or withholding of removal.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2006); see 
also supra notes 51–52. 
185 The Third Circuit stated this concern in Paul Pierre: 
To the extent that the majority fears that such a holding would open the 
floodgates to CAT petitioners from places such as Haiti where the petitioner will 
likely be subjected to deplorable conditions, there remains an evidentiary burden 
of showing that would-be torturers in such places know of or desire the resulting 
infliction of severe pain and suffering. 
Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 195 n.10 (Rendell, J., concurring). 
186 See, e.g., Jean-Pierre v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 500 F.3d 1315, 1318, 1325–26 (11th Cir. 
2007) (remanding the matter to the BIA because a Haitian criminal deportee with mental 
illness presented a different set of facts than the petitioner in In re J-E- and, therefore, 
required a new CAT protection finding); Lavira, 478 F.3d at 159, 170–71; cf. Franck 
Pierre, 502 F.3d at 121 (rejecting a CAT claim when evidence showed either that the 
applicant’s family in Haiti would likely bring him medicine or that he would be released in 
a timely fashion). 
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human rights documentation of the conditions in Haitian prisons,187 
which has proved valuable for convincing adjudicators that the 
Haitian government knows that severe pain or suffering will likely 
result for many criminal deportees.188 
B.  Courts Punt Humanitarian Decisions to the Prosecuting Agency 
The cases described above demonstrate the Third Circuit’s 
willingness to examine CAT protection through the eyes of the victim 
only when that victim has particularly compelling facts and a minor 
criminal record.189  In a footnote in Paul Pierre, the Third Circuit 
attempted to find an alternative solution that appeased the consciences 
of all judges deciding these difficult CAT protection cases: if a case 
had compelling humanitarian factors, the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) could grant “deferred action.”190  Deferred 
 
187 Whereas the applicant in In re J-E- only presented some proof of the conditions, 
which included a U.S. State Department report and a Miami Herald article, applicants 
today call upon the expert testimony of Michelle Karshan, the director of Alternative 
Chance in Haiti, to give a detailed description of the conditions in the Haitian prisons.  In 
re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 293 (B.I.A. 2002); see also Alternative Chance/Chans 
Alternativ, http://www.alternativechance.org (last visited Apr. 10, 2010).  Alternative 
Chance, which began as a prisoner reentry program for criminal deportees to Haiti, 
morphed into a human rights documentation organization to provide evidence of Haitian 
prison conditions for criminal deportees and advocate on behalf of the deportees.  The 
director of Alternative Chance, Michelle Karshan, regularly testifies as an expert witness 
in Haitian CAT cases in immigration courts throughout the United States.  See In re J-E-, 
23 I. & N. Dec. at 293; see also Jean-Pierre, 500 F.3d at 1319; Lavira, 478 F.3d at 163. 
188 In addition, while the BIA could say that the Haitian government was attempting to 
fix the conditions for the deportees, as time has passed and no fix to either the policy or the 
conditions has come, adjudicators can now conclude that the Haitian authorities do 
specifically intend to cause severe pain or suffering to the deportees.  Indeed, one Boston 
immigration judge has decided that applicants for CAT protection could distinguish In re 
J-E- by the time that had elapsed since the BIA decided the case in 2002.  Because these 
horrible prison conditions persisted several years later, the immigration judge reasoned 
that the Haitian government now has the specific intent to cause severe pain or suffering.  
See In re E-M- (Boston Immigr. Ct. Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author); In re P-C- 
(Boston Immigr. Ct. Dec. 21, 2006) (on file with author). 
189 Compare Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 182–83, 189 (stating specific intent means acting 
with the precise purpose to bring about a desired result; the applicant in this case suffered 
from a “self-imposed” physical ailment resulting from his failed attempt at suicide after 
repeatedly stabbing his girlfriend with a meat cleaver), with Lavira, 478 F.3d at 170–71 
(stating specific intent can be proved through willful blindness; the applicant was a 
wheelchair-bound, above-the-knee double amputee, and HIV-positive man who was 
convicted of purchasing one ten-dollar bag of drugs for an undercover agent). 
190 See Paul Pierre, 528 F.3d at 191 n.8 (“Nothing herein prevents the government from 
granting discretionary relief to [Paul] Pierre in the form of deferred action.  Though we are 
bound to the specific intent requirement contained in the CAT, the government is not.”).  
In Lavira, the DHS had offered deferred action to the applicant if he agreed to withdraw 
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action, which is a form of prosecutorial discretion,191 can be granted 
only by the DHS, the prosecuting agency.192  Thus, courts are 
attempting to pass off their responsibility under the CAT to protect a 
noncitizen from torture to an agency that may not act sympathetically 
toward many CAT applicants in exercising its discretion.193  Unlike 
 
his appeal at the agency level.  Lavira, 478 F.3d at 163 n.6.  Because he refused to do so, 
the Third Circuit did not view this as a realistic option for that applicant.  See id. 
191 To ameliorate a harsh and unjust outcome, the DHS may decline to institute 
proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation.  
This exercise in administrative discretion, which is not authorized by statute, originally 
was known as “nonpriority” and is now known as “deferred action.”  A noncitizen may be 
granted deferred action at any stage of the removal process.  Granting deferred action 
status means that, for humanitarian reasons, no action will thereafter be taken to proceed 
against an apparently removable noncitizen.  See 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., 
IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 72.03(2)(h) (rev. ed. 2008).  An Immigration and 
Naturalization Service memo from 2000 states that the Agency must look at the following 
factors when considering an application for deferred action or prosecutorial discretion: 
immigration status, length of residence in the United States, criminal history, humanitarian 
concerns, immigration history, likelihood of removing the person, likelihood of achieving 
enforcement goal by other means, eligibility for other relief, effect on future admissibility, 
current or past cooperation with law enforcement authorities, honorable U.S. military 
service, community attention, and resources available to the agency.  Memorandum from 
Doris Meissner, INS Comm’r, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion to Reg’l Dirs., Dist. 
Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, and Reg’l & Dist. Counsel of INS 7–8 (Nov. 17, 2000), in 77 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1673, 1679–80 (2000) [hereinafter Meissner Memo]. 
192 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) reads: 
Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law 
. . . no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of 
any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to 
commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any 
alien under this [Act]. 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (2006).  In addition, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) precludes judicial review of 
decisions or actions of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security; the 
authority for this preclusion is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the 
Attorney General or the Secretary of Homeland Security.  Courts have generally rejected 
challenges to arbitrary refusals to grant deferred action.  See, e.g., Romeiro de Silva v. 
Smith, 773 F.2d 1021, 1024–25 (9th Cir. 1985) (finding the court had no jurisdiction to 
review the refusal to grant deferred action because the informal administrative practice 
“creates no protectible liberty interest in deferred action, nor does it create a protectible 
interest in being considered for deferred action status”); Velasco-Gutierrez v. Crossland, 
732 F.2d 792, 793–94, 797 (10th Cir. 1984) (“‘[D]eferred action’ or ‘nonpriority’ status is 
essentially an administrative decision by the Service not to deport an otherwise deportable 
alien,” so therefore, a noncitizen’s interest in the grant of this relief, in light of the 
“unfettered discretion[,] . . . [is] too remote and insubstantial to rise to the level of a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest.”); Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 662 (11th 
Cir. 1983) (holding that, since deferred action practice does not confer a substantive right, 
the court has no authority to review the refusal of a request for deferred action 
consideration in absence of a showing of abuse of discretion). 
193 Many applicants for protection under Article 3 have criminal records that bar them 
from other forms of relief; this criminal history can be weighed against the humanitarian 
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the DHS, which can weigh an applicant’s criminal record against 
humanitarian factors to determine who merits deferred action, courts 
deciding applications for deferral of removal under the CAT must 
consider only the likelihood of torture in the home country.194 
In addition, deferred action and other types of individualized, 
discretionary relief have proved to be unworkable in the asylum 
context.  Before the asylum law existed as it does today,195 people 
requesting protection from harm would seek parole to enter the 
United States.196  These decisions to grant parole occurred through an 
unstructured, discretionary system with no judicial oversight.  This 
method of asking for protection proved to be unworkable for the DHS 
and begged for legal uniformity, which prompted Congress to pass 
the Refugee Act in 1980.197  Similarly, serious problems arise when 
courts request that government agencies take over the decision 
making regarding protection for victims of persecution or torture.  In 
regards to the CAT, such courts are punting the decision to the DHS 
and effectively converting a mandatory decision into a discretionary 
one. 
 
factors in their cases when they seek prosecutorial discretion.  See Meissner Memo, supra 
note 191, at 1679–80; see also id. at 1679 (“There is no precise formula for identifying 
which cases warrant a favorable exercise of discretion.”). 
194 While a “particularly serious crime” is a bar to asylum, withholding of removal 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and withholding of removal under the CAT, there is no 
criminal bar to deferral of removal under the CAT.  See supra note 52.  Also, unlike 
asylum, deferral and withholding of removal under the CAT are not discretionary.  8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b) (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(d)(1), 208.17(a) (2009); INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.5 (1987).  Therefore, a court considering an application for 
deferral of removal under the CAT may not deny the claim based on the applicant’s 
criminal record.  8 C.F.R. § 208.17. 
195 Today, asylum laws and regulations are codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 and 8 C.F.R. §§ 
208.1 to 208.15. 
196 See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 427 n.4.  There were a few predecessors to the 
asylum and withholding of removal statutes, but these statutes were either entirely 
discretionary or allowed protection only to certain persons, i.e., those fleeing a communist-
dominated country.  See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 50, at 847–48. 
197 Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study 
on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 438–39 (1992) (explaining that the Refugee Act was 
enacted to achieve uniform, fair, and impartial asylum procedures).  The 1980 Refugee 
Act added 8 U.S.C. § 1158 establishing asylum status, which is discretionary.  The Act 
also amended the nonrefoulement section of the Immigration and Nationality Act, then 8 
U.S.C. § 1253(h), to make its provisions mandatory.  ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 50, at 
847–49. 
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V 
A BETTER CHOICE: “FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES” DEFINITION OF 
SPECIFIC INTENT 
A more generous definition of specific intent would allow 
adjudicators to focus on the likely harm to the victim; as such, this 
definition would better effectuate the history and purpose of 
protection under Article 3 of the CAT.  Under this definition, specific 
intent means “knowing the act would likely result in severe pain or 
suffering.”  This meaning finds ample support in criminal law 
jurisprudence; it has also been proposed by the Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) of the DOJ in its interpretation of the criminal 
provisions of the CAT. 
A.  The Purpose and Legislative History of Article 3 Protection 
The “hair-splitting”198 of deciding the meaning of specific intent in 
CAT protection cases comes down to a life-or-death situation for 
most applicants.  One scholar has commented that proof of intent in 
the area of criminal law has been modified to protect perceived 
societal interests.199  Courts are willing to apply a “result-oriented 
construction of the statute’s mental requirement”200 in criminal law 
cases to avoid prosecution for a particularly compelling defendant or 
ensure prosecution for a particularly detestable defendant.201  Courts 
also may be willing to interpret a statute to contain a mens rea of 
general intent, as opposed to specific intent, to preclude an 
intoxication defense.202  The proverbial hair should be split in favor 
of Article 3 applicants, for whom there is a societal interest203 in 
 
198 United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 407 (1980). 
199 Musalo, supra note 135, at 1229. 
200 Batey, supra note 71, at 348. 
201 See id. at 386. 
202 The Connecticut Supreme Court sought to prevent an intoxication defense for rape 
by holding that it was a general intent crime.  See State v. Smith, 554 A.2d 713, 716 
(Conn. 1989).  The court stated: “The difficulty of convicting a thoroughly intoxicated 
person of rape, if awareness of lack of consent were an element of the crime, would 
diminish the protection that our statutes presently afford to potential victims from lustful 
drunkards.”  Id. 
203 The CAT proposed to “make more effective the struggle against torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment throughout the world.”  CAT, supra 
note 6, preamble, at 113; see also CAT REPORT, supra note 14, at 3 (discussing 
Congress’s passage of a joint resolution in 1984 that both reaffirmed the federal 
government’s opposition to torture and its commitment to combat the practice of torture 
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protection from enduring severe pain or suffering at the hands of a 
foreign government.204 
Moreover, the term “specific intent” is so malleable that a more 
expansive definition can be supported with ample criminal law 
jurisprudence.205  Defining specific intent to include both purposeful 
and knowing acts is not contrary to the legislative will, as Presidents 
Reagan and Bush and the Senate did not follow the Model Penal Code 
approach to defining the mens rea of torture in the CAT, which would 
have given courts more direction.206  The Senate instead ratified the 
CAT with an understanding that included a specific intent 
requirement, despite years of criminal law jurisprudence that showed 
the varying possible definitions of the term.207 
The adoption of the specific intent requirement as an 
understanding, not a reservation, is significant.  Reservations alter a 
country’s treaty obligations; whereas understandings contain the 
Senate’s interpretation of certain provisions.208  As the Third Circuit 
stated: “This suggests to us that the commonly understood meaning at 
the time of ratification was that, at least to the United States, the 
specific intent standard was consistent with a reasonable 
 
and expressed support for the involvement of the government in the formulation of 
international standards and effective implementing mechanisms against torture). 
204 Professor Musalo argued that asylum seekers should also get the benefit of the 
“perceived societal interest” in protecting them from persecution.  See Musalo, supra note 
135, at 1228–39. 
205 See cases cited supra Parts II.A and III.B. 
206 At the same time Presidents Reagan and Bush submitted the understandings to the 
CAT and the Senate adopted such understandings, the Model Penal Code had been enacted 
to clarify the murky waters of specific and general intent.  See Méndez, supra note 79, at 
430 (“A solution to the confusion the common-law terms have created is to adopt the mens 
rea terms conceived by the American Law Institute.”).  Moreover, at the time that the 
Senate adopted the understandings and Congress passed the FARRA, the definition of 
“specific intent” had been interpreted to include “knowingly” and not just “purposefully.”  
See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 157 (1987); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978); United States v. Silverman, 745 F.2d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 
1984); United States v. Buffalano, 727 F.2d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1984); United States v. 
Neiswender, 590 F.2d 1269, 1273 (4th Cir. 1979). 
207 See cases cited supra Parts II.A and III.B. 
208 See LIESBETH LIJNZAAD, RESERVATIONS TO UN-HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: 
RATIFY AND RUIN? 60 (1995) (describing interpretations such as U.S. understandings as a 
“transition from the text of a treaty to treaty practice”); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 
429–30 (2000) (analogizing reservations to “counteroffers” in a bilateral treaty and stating 
the traditional rule in bilateral treaties that the reserving state generally is not a party to the 
treaty unless every other party agrees to the reservation). 
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interpretation of the language in Article 1.”209  The Senate could have 
determined that the specific intent standard would include more than 
purposeful conduct,210 as this definition is consistent with the one 
used by many criminal courts.211  It is also consistent with “a 
reasonable interpretation of the language in Article 1,”212 as no other 
country limits the definition of torture to only purposeful conduct.213 
B.  The Justice Department’s Definition of Specific Intent 
The DOJ also relied on a more expansive definition of specific 
intent in the context of whether U.S. interrogators should be punished 
under the CAT for their treatment of detainees.214  Initially, the OLC 
had a very narrow reading of the specific intent element of torture, 
 
209 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 143 n.20 (3d Cir. 2005). 
210 It is a well-settled principle that Congress is presumed to be aware of existing case 
law when it legislates.  See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 212 (1993) 
(noting the “presumption that Congress was aware of [prior] judicial interpretations [of a 
statute] and, in effect, adopted them”); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) 
(“‘[W]e do not lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from established 
principles’” created through judicial decisions. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 
456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982))); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32 (1990) (“We 
assume that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation.”). 
211 See cases cited supra note 206. 
212 Auguste, 395 F.3d at 143 n.20. 
213 See BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 20 (discussing that all countries other than the 
United States advocated for a definition of “torture” that included acts that are committed 
with “general intent,” which can include grossly negligent acts); BURGERS & DANELIUS, 
supra note 24, at 118 (“According to the definition in article 1, torture must be an 
intentional act.  It follows that where pain or suffering is the result of an accident or of 
mere negligence, the criteria for regarding the act as torture are not fulfilled.”); Copelon, 
supra note 136, at 326 (“The intent required under the international torture conventions is 
simply the general intent to do the act which clearly or foreseeably causes terrible 
suffering.”).  In 2002, when the OLC was asked to interpret the criminal provisions of the 
CAT, the OLC erroneously concluded that all other countries advocated for a specific 
intent requirement in the definition of torture.  See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., on Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–
2340A to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 15 n.7 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter 
Bybee Memo], available at http://news.findlaw.com/nytimes/docs/doj/bybee80102mem 
.pdf.  But see BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 20 (“The U.S. was the only country that was 
not satisfied with the term ‘intentionally.’  No other State commented on it; it invited no 
serious discussion from the Working Group and the U.S.’s proposal was not adopted.”).  
In the same footnote in the Bybee Memo, the OLC stated that even if a narrow reading of 
the “specific intent” requirement was not consistent with the Article 1 definition of torture, 
“the [specific intent] understanding represents a modification of the obligation undertaken 
by the United States.”  See Bybee Memo, supra, at 15 n.7.  But see supra note 208 and 
accompanying text (describing that reservations, not understandings, alter a country’s 
treaty obligations). 
214 See Levin Memo, supra note 22. 
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which was similar to the BIA’s definition in In re J-E-.215  In an 
“infamous” 2002 memo, the OLC gave Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) operatives a definition of torture under 18 U.S.C. § 2340216 
that allowed the agents to use harsh interrogation techniques without 
subjecting them to prosecution for torture.217  Regarding torture, this 
2002 memo concluded that “even if the defendant knows that severe 
pain will result from his actions, if causing such harm is not his 
objective, he lacks the requisite specific intent even though the 
defendant did not act in good faith.”218 
In its December 30, 2004, memo on U.S. torture policy, which 
superseded the 2002 memo in its entirety,219 the Justice Department 
 
215 See Bybee Memo, supra note 213, at 3–5.  For a discussion of how the Bush 
administration’s narrow definition of “torture” had a collateral effect on CAT applicants, 
see Renee C. Redman, Defining “Torture”: The Collateral Effect on Immigration Law of 
the Attorney General’s Narrow Interpretation of “Specifically Intended” when Applied to 
United States Interrogators, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 465 (2007). 
216 18 U.S.C. § 2340A makes it a criminal offense for any person outside of the United 
States to commit or attempt to commit torture.  18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) defines an act of 
torture as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law specifically 
intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering 
incident to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or physical control.” 
217 See generally Bybee Memo, supra note 213; Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without 
Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 641, 645–46 (2005).  In April 2009, President 
Obama released four additional OLC memos concerning U.S. interrogation techniques in 
response to a Freedom of Information Act request.  Mark Mazzetti & Scott Shane, Memos 
Spell Out Brutal C.I.A. Mode of Interrogation, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2009, at A1.  One of 
the memos, also written by Jay Bybee in 2002, applies his narrow definition of torture to 
authorize specific interrogation tactics that were used against al Qaeda operative Abu 
Zubaydah.  See generally Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., on 
Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, Cent. 
Intelligence Agency (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://i.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2009/images/ 
05/22/bybee.pdf. 
218 Bybee Memo, supra note 213, at 4.  Dean Koh criticized the Bybee Memo as 
“perhaps the most clearly erroneous legal opinion I have ever read.” Koh, supra note 217, 
at 647.  He cited “five obvious failures” of the Bybee Memo, which are: (1) the opinion 
fails to mention the legal and historical context in which the memo was written; (2) the 
opinion defines “torture” so narrowly that the word’s meaning is lost and even Saddam 
Hussein’s security forces’ techniques would not constitute torture; (3) the opinion 
misinterprets the power of the President under the Commander-in-Chief power in Article 
II of the Constitution by suggesting that, through this power, the President can sanction 
torture and Congress has no power to interfere; (4) the opinion suggests that lower 
executive officials can escape prosecution for illegal torture by claiming that they were 
“just following orders”; and (5) the opinion suggests that the CAT allows cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment as permissible U.S. government interrogation tactics.  Id. at 647–
53. 
219 Dean Koh discussed the repudiation of the 2002 memo: 
 After being leaked to the press shortly after the revelation of atrocities at Abu 
Ghraib, the Bybee Opinion sparked a firestorm of criticism.  After months of 
 2009] Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim Protection 819 
redefined the specific intent element of torture, citing Wayne R. 
LaFave’s Substantive Criminal Law.220  The 2004 memo stated that 
the specific intent element would be met if the defendant performed 
an act and “consciously desires” that act to inflict severe physical or 
mental pain or suffering.221  The memo recognized that a mens rea of 
knowledge could also suffice to prove specific intent: 
[I]f an individual acted in good faith, and only after reasonable 
investigation establishing that his conduct would not inflict severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering, it appears unlikely that he 
would have the specific intent necessary to violate sections 2340-
2340A.  Such an individual could be said neither consciously to 
desire the proscribed result, see, e.g., Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405, nor to 
have ‘knowledge or notice’ that his act ‘would likely have resulted 
in’ the proscribed outcome, Neiswender, 590 F.2d at 1273.222 
If the DOJ is willing to expose U.S. interrogators to easier 
prosecution for torture by broadly defining specific intent, then it is 
absurd that those seeking protection under the CAT must use a 
narrower definition to prove that the acts they fear are “torture.”223  
The DOJ found sufficient ambiguity in the legislative history of the 
CAT to interpret the specific intent requirement according to the 
common law definition,224 thus rendering more criminal defendants 
 
public debate, it was finally rescinded on December 30, 2004, less than a week 
before its addressee, Alberto Gonzales, appeared before the Senate for his 
confirmation hearings as Attorney General of the United States. 
Id. at 646.  “Almost as soon as the Bybee Opinion made it to the front page of [the] New 
York Times, the Administration repudiated it, demonstrating how obviously wrong the 
opinion was.”  Id. at 655. 
220 Levin Memo, supra note 22. 
221 Id. (quoting LAFAVE, supra note 13, § 5.2(a), at 341). 
222 Id.  Of the four memos released by President Obama in April 2009, three memos, 
written in 2005, assured the CIA that its interrogation techniques were still legal, even 
when multiple methods were combined.  Mazzetti & Shane, supra note 217, at A1.  The 
2005 memos did not alter the definition of specific intent cited in the 2004 Levin Memo.  
See, e.g., Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
on Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in 
the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. 
Counsel, Cent. Intelligence Agency, 29–30 (May 10, 2005), available at 
http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/olc_memos.html; Levin Memo, supra note 22. 
223 See Redman, supra note 215, at 489–91; see also Franck Pierre v. Gonzales, 502 
F.3d 109, 120 (2d Cir. 2007) (“It is unseemly for a government to adopt different 
meanings of the same word in the same treaty; and it is imprudent for a court to fix on a 
special or unnatural meaning in litigation when the political branches are evidently 
disposed otherwise.”). 
224 See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 73, § 10.04, at 130 (“At common law, a person 
‘intentionally’ causes the social harm of an offense if: (1) it is his desire (i.e., his conscious 
object) to cause the social harm; or (2) he acts with knowledge that the social harm is 
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guilty of torture.  Assuming such ambiguity exists, the use of a 
narrower definition of specific intent in civil immigration cases as 
compared to criminal cases flies in the face of the rule of lenity.225 
VI 
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CONCERNS 
One solution I propose is for Attorney General Holder to issue a 
new precedential decision modifying the BIA’s definition of specific 
intent in In re J-E-.  An alternative solution is for courts to adopt the 
“foreseeable consequences” definition of specific intent, 
notwithstanding In re J-E-.  Both of these solutions present their own 
problems, however, which are discussed below. 
A.  Policy Concerns for the Attorney General to Overrule In re J-E- 
As the agency entrusted with the adjudication of CAT protection 
cases, the DOJ may change its official position on its interpretation of 
the definition of torture.226  As discussed in Part V, a “foreseeable 
consequences” definition in these cases would unify the DOJ’s 
interpretation of the specific intent standard of the CAT in both 
 
virtually certain to occur as a result of his conduct.” (footnote omitted)); LAFAVE, supra 
note 13, § 5.2, at 340 (“Intent has traditionally been defined to include knowledge, and 
thus it is usually said that one intends certain consequences when he desires that his acts 
cause those consequences or knows that those consequences are substantially certain to 
result from his acts.”). 
225 The rule of lenity requires that courts interpret ambiguous statutes in a manner 
favorable to a criminal defendant.  It is a principle of law that only applies to ambiguous 
statutes because a clear intention from the legislature overrides a court’s preference for 
what types of offenses should be punished under the criminal statute.  See DRESSLER, 
supra note 73, § 5.04, at 50–51. 
226 Indeed, in the waning days of the Bush administration, Attorney General Mukasey 
issued two precedent decisions that overruled longstanding BIA precedent in immigration 
law.  See In re Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2009) (holding that there is 
no Fifth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in immigration proceedings 
and, thus, no right to file a motion to reopen based on such ineffective assistance); In re 
Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 699–704 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008) (holding that the 
“categorical inquiry,” which requires adjudicators to examine only the elements of a crime 
and the record of conviction to determine whether a noncitizen is removable for a criminal 
conviction, is not always the proper method for determining whether an offense involves 
moral turpitude); see also Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 
U.S. 967, 981 (2005) (“‘An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.  
On the contrary, the agency . . . must consider varying interpretations and the wisdom of 
its policy on a continuing basis,’ . . . for example, in response to changed factual 
circumstances, or a change in administrations . . . .” (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984) (internal citations omitted) 
(first alteration in original)). 
 2009] Specific Intent and the Purposeful Narrowing of Victim Protection 821 
criminal prosecution and protection cases.  It would also unite the 
United States with our world allies227 because all countries would 
present a unified definition of “torture.”228  In 2002, when the BIA 
decided In re J-E-, it was the early stages of interpreting the 
Convention.229  With the benefit of the 2004 OLC memo230 and 
guidance from circuit courts’ interpretations of specific intent,231 
Attorney General Holder can take another look at the definition of 
torture. 
However, the BIA’s holding in In re J-E- implicitly reflects the 
congressional intent to limit Article 3 protection so that criminals 
would not be eligible for this relief from removal.232  The decision 
also reflects a broader “floodgates” concern, one that had reared its 
head in asylum cases before CAT protection was available.233  The 
applicant’s facts in In re J-E- present a practical quandary: if Haitian 
prison conditions “torture” and the evidence clearly demonstrates that 
criminal deportees are more likely than not to be detained in these 
 
227 See Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), 
reprinted in The Address: “All This We Will Do,” N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009, at P2 (“And 
so, to all other peoples and governments who are watching today, from the grandest 
capitals to the small village where my father was born, know that America is a friend of 
each nation, and every man, woman and child who seeks a future of peace and dignity.”). 
228 See BOULESBAA, supra note 33, at 20. 
229 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 309 (B.I.A. 2002) (Schmidt, dissenting). 
230 See supra Part V.B. 
231 See supra Part IV.A. 
232 FARRA § 2242(c) states: 
To the maximum extent consistent with the obligations of the United States 
under the Convention, subject to any reservations, understandings, declarations, 
and provisos contained in the United States Senate resolution of ratification of 
the Convention, the regulations . . . shall exclude from the protection of such 
regulations aliens described in . . . 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3)(B) . . . . 
FARRA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, tit. XXII, § 2242(c), 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–822; 8 U.S.C. § 
1231(b)(3)(B) (2006) (listing conviction of particularly serious crime, persecution of 
others, commission of serious nonpolitical crime before arrival in the United States, 
danger to the security of the United States); see also In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 311 
(Rosenberg, dissenting) (“It is no secret that Congress was not pleased with being 
obligated to extend protection to persons, including those with criminal convictions, who 
are barred from eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal.”). 
233 See, e.g., Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (“If persecution were 
defined that expansively, a significant percentage of the world’s population would qualify 
for asylum in this country—and it seems most unlikely that Congress intended such a 
result.”); In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 350 (B.I.A. 1996) (Heilman, dissenting) (“Indeed, 
if one pursues the majority’s logic, all warring sides persecute one another, and this means 
that all civil wars are nothing more than acts of persecution.  The implications of such a 
sweeping conception of ‘persecution’ should give us all pause.”). 
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conditions, then would this ruling encourage Haitians to come to the 
United States, commit crimes, then demand protection?234  And what 
about all of the lawful, permanent resident Haitians, now facing 
removal for an aggravated felony, who Congress deemed unworthy of 
a second chance?235  Would Article 3 protection become their back 
door to staying in the United States? 
Despite these floodgate concerns, a broader definition of specific 
intent will not provide relief to all Haitian criminal deportees.  For 
example, Haitians who do not suffer from a life-threatening illness 
may not be able to prove that their pain and suffering is severe 
enough to merit CAT protection.236  In addition, criminal deportees 
who can secure timely release from prison in Haiti may not be able to 
prove that they are more likely than not to endure severe pain or 
suffering.237 
B.  Chevron Deference to the BIA’s Definition of Specific Intent 
If courts begin to adopt a uniform, broad reading of specific intent 
in CAT protection cases, they face the doctrine of Chevron 
deference.238  A general principle of administrative law is that once 
an agency has interpreted the statute it was entrusted to administer, it 
is unlikely that a federal court will second-guess the agency’s 
 
234 See Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 396 (1st Cir. 2004) (refusing to recognize “a 
‘social group’ consisting of deported Haitian nationals with criminal records in the United 
States” out of concern that these Haitians could commit crimes in the United States, “thus 
immunizing them from deportation”). 
235 In 1997, Congress eliminated the waiver of deportation that previously was available 
to long-term permanent U.S. residents who had been convicted of an aggravated felony 
and replaced the waiver with cancellation of removal; noncitizens who have been 
convicted of an aggravated felony are barred from cancellation of removal.  See Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA), Pub. L. No. 
104-208, div. C, tit. III, § 304, 110 Stat. 3009–546, 3009–587. 
236 In In re J-E-, the BIA discussed the meaning of “severe pain or suffering” in the 
definition of torture and concluded that certain acts of police brutality were not “torture.”  
In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 295–98. 
237 The most recent U.S. Department of State report on human rights conditions in Haiti 
states: “Because of lack of available space in prisons and detention centers, the 
government made efforts to release the deportees quickly.”  BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 2008 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: HAITI (2009), available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/wha/119163.htm; see also In re M-B-A-, 23 I. & 
N. Dec. 474, 477–80 (B.I.A. 2002) (holding that a Nigerian woman who feared torture in a 
Nigerian prison as a criminal deportee could not prove that the feared detention was more 
likely than not to happen to her). 
238 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 
(1984). 
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interpretation.239  Under this principle, commonly known as 
“Chevron deference,” a reviewing court must determine whether 
Congress clearly answered the question at issue in the statutory 
language.240  If Congress was clear, the reviewing court follows the 
language of the statute without deference to the agency.241  If 
Congress was ambiguous in the statutory language, the court will 
defer to the agency’s interpretation so long as the interpretation is 
reasonable.242  Commentators have suggested that if a reviewing 
court finds the statute to be ambiguous, the court routinely defers to 
the agency.243 
In the context of immigration law, Chevron deference is 
particularly rampant.  Courts repeatedly quote the Supreme Court’s 
1999 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre decision244: “judicial deference to the 
Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration context 
where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that 
implicate questions of foreign relations.’”245  The notion that 
“[i]mmigration has been a part of our foreign relations, and foreign 
relations has been the reserve of the political branches”246 explains 
 
239 Id. at 844.  An agency must promulgate the interpretation in the exercise of its 
congressional authority in order to merit Chevron deference.  See United States v. Mead 
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).  Thus, an improper process, such as failing to 
propose a regulation and provide a notice-and-comment period, may cause a court to 
refuse deference to the agency’s interpretation.  See id. 
240 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
241 Id. at 842–43. 
242 Id. at 843–44. 
243 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE 
L.J. 969, 977 (1992) (“Under Chevron, the court must initially establish whether the issue 
is suitable for independent judicial resolution; if it is not, the court automatically shifts into 
a deferential mode.  As a result, independent judgment now requires special justification, 
and deference is the default rule.”). 
244 INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999). 
245 Id. at 425 (quoting INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)); see also, e.g., Villegas 
v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 984, 988 (9th Cir. 2008). 
246 Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 340 
(2002).  In The Chinese Exclusion Case in 1889, the Supreme Court explained the plenary 
power doctrine: 
The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging 
to the government of the United States as a part of those sovereign powers 
delegated by the constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the 
judgment of the government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be 
granted away or restrained on behalf of any one. 
Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889).  
For a general discussion of the executive branch’s plenary power over immigration law, 
see DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION NATION: OUTSIDERS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 
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the executive branch’s “plenary power” over immigration law and the 
extreme deference given to the agency in immigration cases.247  In its 
interpretation of the CAT, an international treaty adopted into U.S. 
law, courts have given deference to the BIA because it is an executive 
agency interpreting U.S. treaty obligations.248 
C.  Deference to the BIA’s Interpretation of Criminal Law 
Chevron deference is only appropriate when courts are considering 
a statutory scheme that the agency is entrusted to administer.249  
Unlike a reviewing court, the agency has a “full understanding of the 
force of the statutory policy in the given situation”250 and “[‘]a body 
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
 
(2007); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of 
Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365 (2002); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Federal 
Regulation of Aliens and the Constitution, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 862 (1989). 
247 See KANSTROOM, supra note 246, at 15–20. 
248 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 140 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Franck Pierre v. 
Gonzales, 502 F.3d 109, 117 (2d Cir. 2007) (providing citations to supportive cases); cf. El 
Al Isr. Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) (“Respect is ordinarily due 
the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international 
treaty.”); United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989).  Professor Curtis Bradley 
examined why courts have given Chevron-style deference to the executive branch.  Curtis 
A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 664 (2000).  
Professor Bradley explained justifications for this deference, which include the following: 
(1) unlike domestic law, where power is shared among the three branches of government, 
the executive branch is the sole player in foreign affairs and thus requires flexibility; (2) 
decisions in foreign affairs are more political than legal in nature; and (3) the executive 
branch has much greater expertise and access to information than courts.  Id.  Critiques of 
such deference include: (1) the distinction between foreign and domestic affairs is not 
always clear and has eroded in recent years, (2) the executive branch is not the sole player 
in foreign affairs because the Constitution assigns responsibilities for foreign affairs to all 
three branches of government, (3) the need for flexibility in foreign affairs is no greater 
than in complex domestic matters, and (4) it is not clear to what extent judicial 
enforcement will actually impede the ability of the United States to act effectively in 
international relations.  Id.; see also id. at 703 (citing Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 335–
42, 344–49 (1939)) (comparing treaty resolution to Chevron analysis because courts 
interpreting treaties must determine whether the plain language of the treaty clearly 
resolves the issue).  Some courts have questioned the amount of deference that should be 
given to the BIA’s interpretation of the CAT, which has application outside of the context 
of immigration.  See Franck Pierre, 502 F.3d at 113–14; Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. 
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85 (1982) (“Although not conclusive, the meaning 
attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation 
and enforcement is entitled to great weight.” (emphasis added)). 
249 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984). 
250 Id. (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382–83 (1961)). 
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may properly resort for guidance.’”251  However, courts may interpret 
terms that, while they appear in an agency’s statute, do not require 
specialized knowledge to interpret.  For example, in the 2001 Francis 
v. Reno opinion,252 the Third Circuit decided that the BIA deserved 
no deference when interpreting whether a conviction was an 
“aggravated felony,” which was defined as a crime of violence under 
18 U.S.C. § 16.253  Despite the inclusion of 18 U.S.C. § 16 in the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which the BIA is entrusted to 
administer, the Third Circuit decided that a federal court was equally 
equipped to interpret whether an offense was a crime of violence 
under this federal criminal statute.254 
In the immigration law context, several courts have held that the 
BIA receives Chevron deference when it is interpreting the INA, but 
not when it is interpreting state or federal criminal laws.255  The BIA 
routinely interprets criminal statutes because there are myriad grounds 
for removal that are based upon a criminal conviction.256  When an 
immigration adjudicator is presented with a criminal conviction, the 
categorical approach established by the Supreme Court in Taylor v. 
United States257 is used to determine whether that conviction renders 
the noncitizen removable.  Under the categorical approach, an 
adjudicator must examine only the elements of the criminal statute 
and the minimum conduct necessary for a conviction under the 
statute.  If these match the ground for removal, the inquiry ends there, 
and the adjudicator does not consider the facts that led to the 
 
251 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (quoting Bragdon v. Abbott, 
524 U.S. 624, 642 (1998)). 
252 Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2001). 
253 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (2006). 
254 See Francis, 269 F.3d at 168; see also Dalton v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 200, 203–04 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
255 Soliman v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 2005); Michel v. INS, 206 F.3d 
253, 262 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[W]here the BIA is interpreting § 237(a)(2)(A)(ii) of the INA, 
Chevron deference is warranted, but where the BIA is interpreting state or federal criminal 
laws, we must review its decision de novo.”); see also Hamdan v. INS, 98 F.3d 183, 185 
(5th Cir. 1996).  But see Cabral v. INS, 15 F.3d 193, 197 (1st Cir. 1994). 
256 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2) (2006). 
257 Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).  The Taylor decision addressed 
whether a state burglary conviction was a predicate burglary offense under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(e), which would enhance the defendant’s sentence.  Id. at 602.  Recently, Attorney 
General Mukasey decided that the BIA should abandon the Taylor method for determining 
whether a respondent was convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.  In re Silva-
Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 699–704 (Op. Att’y Gen. 2008). 
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conviction.258  Courts have held that when the BIA is engaged in this 
sort of examination of the elements of a criminal statute, the agency 
does not deserve any deference because courts can and often do 
interpret the elements of a criminal statute.259 
In the CAT context, the BIA is interpreting specific intent, a 
criminal law concept, not an immigration law term such as 
“refugee.”260  Specific intent is not an obscure regulatory concept in 
which courts have no expertise; as stated by the Third Circuit, “[t]he 
specific intent standard is a term of art that is well-known in 
American jurisprudence.”261  For this reason, courts do not 
necessarily owe deference to the BIA’s interpretation of this criminal 
law term.262 
CONCLUSION 
The United States cares about eliminating torture worldwide and 
protecting individuals from torture, as demonstrated by its seven years 
of negotiations of the CAT.  The U.S. ratification of the CAT and 
 
258 Immigration adjudicators may also engage in a “modified categorical approach” if 
the statute, for example, contains some elements included in the ground of removability 
and others that are not included.  In this instance, the adjudicator is permitted to examine 
the record of conviction, which includes the charging document, plea, verdict, and 
sentence.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B) (2006); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 
20–23 (2005) (holding that police reports are not included in the record of conviction in a 
sentencing case); In re Teixeira, 21 I. & N. Dec. 316, 319 (B.I.A. 1996) (holding that 
police reports are not included in the record of conviction in an immigration case).  The 
BIA has also advocated for the use of the categorical approach for policy reasons, as this 
approach prevents adjudicators from using hearing time to “retry” the underlying 
conviction.  See In re Pichardo, 21 I. & N. Dec. 330, 335–36 (B.I.A. 1996); see also 
Conteh v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 45, 56 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[B]ecause the BIA may not 
adjudicate guilt or mete out criminal punishment, it must base removal orders on 
convictions, not on conduct alone.”). 
259 See, e.g., Michel, 206 F.3d at 262. 
260 Cf. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1164, 1167 (2009) (reasoning that whether a 
person is a “persecutor of others” under the INA is an ambiguous statutory concept that 
merits Chevron deference and remanding the case to the BIA to interpret the statutory 
meaning); Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 2004). 
261 Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 145 (3d Cir. 2005).  Despite the large volume of 
case law defining specific intent in American jurisprudence, the BIA cited not a single 
criminal law case in the In re J-E- opinion and only cited Black’s Law Dictionary for its 
“specific intent” definition.  In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291, 301 (B.I.A. 2002). 
262 One scholar suggests that the U.S. Department of Justice should be given Chevron 
deference in its criminal law interpretations as the Agency that specializes in criminal law. 
Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within the 
Executive Branch, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 54 (1998).  This approach, however, 
has not been adopted by the courts. 
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implementation of the treaty demonstrates a further commitment to 
these goals.  However, when asked to interpret Article 3 of the CAT, 
the BIA and several courts have declined to uphold these aspirations 
by setting an insurmountable barrier to relief from removal under the 
CAT.  This barrier is the narrow specific intent definition that 
includes only purposeful conduct, which is exacerbated by the 
requirement that applicants prove a fifty-one percent likelihood of 
such intent by an applicant’s government.  As the dissent stated in In 
re J-E-: 
We are in the early stages of the very difficult and thankless task of 
construing the Convention.  Only time will tell whether the 
majority’s narrow reading of the torture definition and its highly 
technical approach to the standard of proof will be the long-term 
benchmarks for our country’s implementation of this international 
treaty.263 
The Obama administration should create a new benchmark for the 
U.S. implementation of the CAT by reversing the BIA’s holding in In 
re J-E- and redefining specific intent in Article 3 cases.  This new 
definition should include acts that are committed knowing that severe 
pain or suffering is a foreseeable consequence.  In the alternative, 
courts should redefine the term in these cases, notwithstanding the 
principles of Chevron deference.  This new definition is consistent 
with the legislative history and purpose of the CAT because it allows 
an adjudicator to consider the likely harm to the victim and does not 
focus only on the intent of the alleged torturer.  Moreover, time has 
told that the BIA’s early interpretation of the definition of torture was 
too narrow, especially given courts’ broader reading of the term and 
the broader definition of specific intent in the DOJ’s own 2004 memo 
interpreting whether U.S. interrogators could face prosecution under 
the criminal provisions of the CAT.  The executive branch and courts 
should effectuate the goals of Article 3 of the CAT for what it is: a 
human rights instrument that protects victims, not prosecutes 
torturers. 
 
263 In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 309 (Schmidt, dissenting). 
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